



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
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
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MY MISSION TO LONDON 1912 - 1914



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MY MISSION TO LONDON 1912-1914

BY
PRINCE LICHNOWSKY

Late German Ambassador in England

With a Preface by
PROFESSOR GILBERT MURRAY
Author of
"The Policy of Sir Edward Grey," etc.

CASSELL AND COMPANY LIMITED
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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE.

THE author of the following pages, Karl Max, Prince Lichnowsky, is a member of a family which holds estates both in German and Austrian Silesia, and has an hereditary seat in the Upper House of the Prussian Diet. The father of the present Prince and his predecessor in the title was a Prussian cavalry general, who, at the end of his life, sat for some years in the Reichstag as a member of the Free Conservative Party.

His uncle, Prince Felix, was elected in 1848 to represent Ratibor in the German National Assembly at Frankfort-on-Main; he was an active member of the Conservative wing, and during the September rising, while riding with General Auerswald in the neighbourhood of the city, was attacked and murdered by the mob.

The present Prince, after serving in the Prussian army, in which he holds the rank of Major, entered the diplomatic service. He was in 1885 for a short time attached to the German Embassy in London, and afterwards became Councillor of Embassy in Vienna. From 1899 to 1904 he was employed in the German Foreign Office, and received the rank and title of Minister Plenipotentiary.

In 1904 he retired to his Silesian estates, and, as he states, lived for eight years the life of a country gentleman, but read industriously and published occasional political articles. He himself recounts the circumstances in which he was appointed Ambassador in London on the death of Baron Marschall von Bieberstein.

Baron Marschall, who had been Secretary for Foreign Affairs under the Chancellorships of Count Caprivi and for a time under Prince Hohenlohe, had achieved great success as Ambassador at Constantinople, and also, from the German point of view, as chief German Plenipotentiary at the Second Hague Conference in 1907. Baron Marschall was, to use an expression of Bismarck's, "the best horse in Germany's diplomatic stable." And great things were expected of him in London. But he lived only a few months after his appointment.

Prince Lichnowsky's high social rank, his agreeable manners, and the generous hospitality which he showed in Carlton House Terrace gave him a position in English society which facilitated the negotiations between England and Germany, and did much to diminish the friction that had arisen during the time that Prince Bülow held the post of German Chancellor.

The pamphlet which is here translated gives an

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE.

account of his London mission; after his return to Germany he has lived in retirement in the country, but has contributed occasional articles to the Press. The pamphlet, which was written in August, 1916, was not intended for publication, but was distributed confidentially to a few friends. The existence of it had long been known, but it was only in March of this year that for the first time extracts from it were published in the Swedish paper *Politiken*. Longer extracts have since appeared in the London Press; for the first time a complete translation made from the German original is now placed before the public.

PREFACE.

NEVER perhaps in history has the world seen so great an exhibition, as at the outbreak of this war, of the murderous and corrupting power of the organised lie. All Germany outside the governmental circles was induced to believe that the war was a treacherous attack, plotted in the dark by "revengeful France, barbaric Russia, and envious England," against the innocent and peace-loving Fatherland. And the centre of the plot was the Machiavellian Grey, who for long years had been encircling and strangling Germany in order at the chosen moment to deal her a death-blow from behind. The Emperor, the princes, the ministers, the bishops and chaplains, the historians and theologians, in part consciously and in part innocently, vied with one another in solemn attestations and ingenious forgeries of evidence; and the people, docile by training and long indoctrinated to the hatred of England, inevitably believed and passionately exaggerated what they were told. From this belief, in large part, came the strange brutalities and ferocities of the common people of Germany at the opening of the war, whether towards persons who had a right to courtesy, like the Ambassadors, or a claim on common human

sympathy, like the wounded and the prisoners. The German masses could show no mercy towards people guilty of so hideous a world-crime.

And now comes evidence, which in normal times would convince even the German nation, that the whole basis of their belief was a structure of deliberate falsehood; which shows that it was the Kaiser and his Ministers who plotted the war; while it was England, and especially Sir Edward Grey, who strove hardest for the preservation of peace.

It is the evidence of the German Ambassador in London during the years 1912-1914, Prince Lichnowsky, corroborated rather than confuted by the comments of Herr von Jagow, who was Foreign Minister at the time, and carried further by the recently published Memoranda of Herr Mühlton, one of the directors of the Krupp armament factory at Essen. One could hardly imagine more convincing testimony. Will the German people believe it? Would they believe now if one rose from the dead?

We cannot yet guess at the answer. Indeed, there is another question which must be answered first: For what motive, and with what possible change of policy in view, has the German Government permitted the publication of these papers and the circulation of Lichnowsky's Memorandum as a pamphlet at 30 pfennig? Do the militarists think

their triumph is safe, and the time come for them to throw off the mask? Or have the opponents of militarism, who seemed so crushed, succeeded in asserting their power? Is it a plan to induce the ever docile German populace to hate England less?

It must be a startling story for the Germans, but for us it contains little that is new. It is an absolute confirmation, in spirit and in letter, of the British Blue Book and of English books such as Mr. Headlam's "History of Twelve Days" and Mr. Archer's "Thirteen Days." Prince Lichnowsky's summing-up agrees exactly with the British conclusions: The Germans encouraged Count Berchtold to attack Serbia, well knowing the consequences to expect; between the 23rd and 30th July they rejected all forms of mediation; and on the 30th July, when Austria wished to withdraw, they hastily sent an ultimatum to Russia so as to make withdrawal impossible (pp. 39-40). A ghastly story of blindness and crime; but we knew it all before.

Equally interesting is Prince Lichnowsky's account of the policy of Germany and England before the war. He confirms our knowledge of the "sinister vagueness" of German policy in Morocco, the steady desire of England to come to an understanding and of Germany to elude an understanding. As for our alleged envy of German trade, it was in English

commercial circles that the desire for an understanding with Germany was strongest. As for our "policy of encirclement," it was the deliberate aim of our policy, continuing the line of Lord Salisbury and Mr. Chamberlain, to facilitate rather than hinder the legitimate and peaceful expansion of a great force, which would become dangerous if suppressed and confined.

The test cases were the Bagdad Railway and the Portuguese Colonies. We agreed to make no objection to Germany's buying them, when Portugal was willing to sell; we agreed in the meantime to treat them as a German sphere of interest and not to compete for influence there. We agreed, subject to the conservation of existing British rights and to certain other safeguards, to the completion of the great railway from the Bosphorus to Basra, and to the recognition of the whole district tapped by the railway as a German sphere of interest. The two treaties, though completed, were never signed; why? Because Grey would sign no secret treaty. He insisted that they must be published. And the German Government would not allow them to be published! To Lichnowsky this seemed like mere spite on the part of rivals who grudged his success, but we see now that it was a deliberate policy. The war-makers could not afford

to let their people know the proof of England's goodwill.

Lichnowsky was a friend of England, but he was no pacifist or "little German." His policy was to favour the peaceful expansion of Germany, in good understanding with England and France, on the seas and in the colonies. He aimed at "imperial development" on British lines; he abhorred the "Triple Alliance policy" of espousing Austria's quarrels, backing Turkey against the Balkan States, intriguing against Russia, and seeing all politics in the terms of European rivalries with a background of war. His own policy was one which, if followed loyally by the German Government, would have avoided the war and saved Europe.

There are one or two traits in Lichnowsky's language which show that, with all his liberality of thought, he is still a German. He accepts at once, on the report of a German secret agent, the false statement that Grey had concluded a secret treaty with France. He mentions, as if it were a natural thing, the strange opinion that the *Standard* was "apparently bought by Austria." He describes Mr. Asquith as a pacifist and Sir Edward Grey as both a pacifist and, ideally and practically, a Socialist. One must remember the sort of views he was accustomed to at Potsdam.

There can be no doubt that Lichnowsky was deliberately deceived by his Government, and not much that he was chosen for his post in London with a view to deceiving us. These things are all in gospel according to Bernhardt. Lichnowsky himself was both an honest and an able diplomatist, and there is the ring of sincerity in his words of self-reproach: "I had to support in London a policy the heresy of which I recognised. That brought down vengeance on me, for it was a sin against the Holy Ghost."

If Grey, in the tangle of terrific problems that surrounded him, ever erred, his sin was not against the Holy Ghost. The attack made on him at the outset of the war by Radical idealists was easy to confute. If ever a statesman strove, with due prudence, for peace, for friendship between nations, for a transformation of armed rivalries into cordial and democratic understandings, our great English Minister was that man. He was accused as a maker of secret treaties; and we find him all through the times of peace, and through all times when choice was still possible, a steady refuser of secret treaties. He was accused as a seeker for territory; and we find him, both in war and peace, steadily opposing all territorial aggrandisement. Such was the policy approved by the leaders of both English parties before the war.

It is an attack from the other side that now reaches him. If the war had been short and successful, this would not have occurred. But a long and bitter and dangerous war of necessity creates its own atmosphere and the policy that was wisdom in 1913, when the world was at peace and our relations with Germany were improving, strikes us now perhaps as strangely trustful and generous. Yet, if we try to recover that mental calm without which the nations will never till the end of time be able to restore their wasted wealth and rebuild the shattered hopes of civilisation, I think most Englishmen will agree that Grey's policy was, as we all thought it at the time, the right and the wise policy. To let all the world know that we would never join in any attack on Germany, but would never permit any attack on France; to seek to remove all causes of friction between England and Germany, as they had been removed between England and France and between England and Russia; to extend the "Entente Cordiale" by gradual steps to all nations who would come into it, and to "bring the two groups of Europe nearer." This was the right policy, whether it succeeded or failed; and it will, in spirit at least, some day be the right policy again.

No Englishman, I think, will regret the generous courtesy which sent off the German Ambassador with

a guard of honour, "like a departing sovereign." No one will regret our Prime Minister's silent tears when the war became inevitable, or Grey's conviction that it would be "the greatest catastrophe in history"—not even if mad German militarists drew the conclusion that the only motive for such grief must be the fear of defeat. For my own part I am glad that, at the last interview with Lichnowsky, Grey assured him that, if ever a chance came of mediation between the combatants, he would take it, and that "we have never wished to crush Germany."

Surely, even now in the crisis of the war, it is well to remember these things. The cleaner our national conscience the keener surely will be our will to victory. The slower we were to give up the traditions of generosity and trustfulness that came from our long security the firmer will be our resolution to hold out, through whatever martyrdom may be yet in store for us, until we or our children can afford once more to live generously and to trust our neighbours. In the long run no other life is worth living.

G. M.

MY MISSION TO LONDON

1912-14

MY APPOINTMENT.

IN September, 1912, Baron Marschall died after he had only been at his post in London for a few months. His appointment, which no doubt was principally due to his age and the desire of his junior officer to go to London, was one of the many mistakes of our policy.

In spite of his striking personality and great reputation, he was too old and too tired to adjust himself to the Anglo-Saxon world, which was completely alien to him; he was rather an official and a lawyer than a diplomat and statesman. From the very beginning he was at great pains to convince the English of the harmlessness of our fleet, and naturally this only produced the contrary effect.

Much to my surprise, I was offered the post in October. I had retired to the country as a "Personalreferent" after many years of activity, there being then no suitable post available for me. I passed my time between flax and turnips, among horses and meadows, read extensively, and occasionally published political essays.

Thus I had spent eight years, and it was thirteen since I had left the Embassy at Vienna with the rank of Envoy. That had been my last real sphere of political activity, as in those days such activity was impossible unless one was prepared to help a half-crazy chief in drafting his crotchety orders with their crabbed instructions.

I do not know who was responsible for my being appointed to London. It was certainly not due to H.M. alone—I was not one of his intimates, though he was at all times gracious to me. I also know by experience that his nominees generally met with successful opposition. Herr von Kiderlen had really wanted to send Herr von Stumm to London! He immediately manifested unmistakable ill-will towards me, and endeavoured to intimidate me by his incivility. Herr von Bethmann Hollweg was at that time kindly disposed towards me, and had paid me a visit at Grätz only a short time before. I am therefore inclined to think that they all agreed on me because no other candidate was available at the moment. But for Baron Marschall's unexpected death, I should no more have been called out of retirement then than at any other time during all those previous years.

MOROCCO POLICY.

It was certainly the right moment for a new effort to establish better relations with England. Our enigmatic Morocco policy had repeatedly shaken confidence in our pacific intentions. At the very least, it had given rise to the suspicion that we did not quite know what we wanted, or that it was our object to keep Europe on the *qui vive*, and, when opportunity offered, to humiliate France. An Austrian colleague, who had been in Paris for a long time, said to me: "Whenever the French begin to forget about *revanche*, you always remind them of it with a jack-boot."

After we had repulsed M. Delcassé's efforts to arrive at an understanding with us about Morocco, and prior to that had formally declared that we had no political interests there—which conformed to the traditions of the Bismarckian policy—we suddenly discovered a second Krüger in Abdul

Aziz. We assured him also, like the Boers, of the protection of the mighty German Empire, with the same display and the same result; both demonstrations terminated with our retreat, as they were bound to do, if we had not already made up our minds to embark on the world-war. The distressing congress at Algeçiras could not change this in any way, still less the fall of M. Delcassé.

Our attitude promoted the Russo-Japanese and later the Anglo-Russian *rapprochement*. In face of "the German Peril" all other differences faded into the background. The possibility of a new Franco-German war had become apparent, and such a war could not, as in 1870, leave either Russia or England unaffected.

The uselessness of the Triple Alliance had been shown at Algeçiras, while that of the agreements arrived at there was demonstrated shortly afterwards by the collapse of the Sultanate, which, of course, could not be prevented. Among the German people, however, the belief gained ground that our foreign policy was feeble and was giving way before the "Encirclement"—that high-sounding phrases were succeeded by pusillanimous surrender.

It is to the credit of Herr von Kiderlen, who is otherwise overrated as a statesman, that he wound up our Moroccan inheritance and accepted as they were the facts that could no longer be altered. Whether, indeed, it was necessary to alarm the world by the Agadir incident I will leave others to say. It was jubilantly acclaimed in Germany, but it had caused all the more disquiet in England because the Government were kept waiting for three weeks for an explanation of our intentions. Lloyd George's speech, which was meant as a warning to us, was the consequence. Before Delcassé's fall, and before Algeçiras, we might have had a harbour and territory on the West Coast, but after those events it was impossible.

SIR EDWARD GREY'S PROGRAMME.

When I came to London in November, 1912, the excitement over Morocco had subsided, as an agreement with France had been reached in Berlin. It is true that Haldane's mission had failed, as we had required the assurance of neutrality, instead of being content with a treaty securing us against British attacks and attacks with British support. Yet Sir Edward Grey had not relinquished the idea of arriving at an agreement with us, and in the first place tried to do this in colonial and economic questions. Conversations were in progress through the capable and business-like Envoy von Kühlmann concerning the renewal of the Portuguese colonial agreement and Mesopotamia (Bagdad Railway), the unwavering object of which was to divide both the colonies and Asia Minor into spheres of influence.

The British statesman, after having settled all outstanding points of difference with France and Russia, wished to make similar agreements with us. It was not his object to isolate us, but to the best of his power to make us partners in the existing association. As he had succeeded in overcoming Anglo-French and Anglo-Russian differences, so he also wished to do his best to eliminate the Anglo-German, and by a network of treaties, which would in the end no doubt have led to an agreement about the troublesome question of naval armaments, to ensure the peace of the world, after our previous policy had led to an association—the Entente—which represented a mutual insurance against the risk of war.

This was Sir E. Grey's plan. In his own words: Without interfering with our existing friendship with France and Russia, which has no aggressive aims and does not entail any binding obligations on England, to arrive at a friendly *rapprochement* and understanding with Germany, "to bring the two groups nearer."

As with us, there were two parties in England at that time—the Optimists, who believed in an understanding, and the Pessimists, who thought that sooner or later war was inevitable.

The former embraced Messrs. Asquith, Grey, Lord Haldane, and most of the Ministers in the Radical Cabinet; also the leading Liberal papers, such as the *Westminster Gazette*, *Manchester Guardian*, *Daily Chronicle*. The Pessimists were mainly Conservative politicians like Mr. Balfour, who repeatedly made this clear to me; also leading Army men, like Lord Roberts, who pointed out the necessity of universal military service ("The Writing on the Wall"); further, the Northcliffe Press and the eminent English journalist Mr. Garvin, of *The Observer*. During my period of office, however, they abstained from all attacks, and maintained both personally and politically a friendly attitude. But our naval policy and our attitude in 1905, 1908, and 1911 had aroused in them the conviction that after all it would some day come to war. Just as it is with us, the former are now being accused in England of short-sightedness and simplicity, whereas the latter are looked on as the true prophets.

THE ALBANIAN QUESTION.

The first Balkan War had led to the collapse of Turkey and thus to a defeat for our policy, which had been identified with Turkey for a number of years. Since Turkey in Europe could no longer be saved, there were two ways in which we could deal with the inheritance: either we could declare our complete disinterestedness with regard to the frontier delimitations and leave the Balkan Powers to settle them, or we could support our "Allies" and carry on a Triple Alliance policy in the Near East, thus giving up the rôle of mediator.

From the very beginning I advocated the former course, but the Foreign Office emphatically favoured the latter.

The vital point was the Albanian question. Our Allies desired the establishment of an independent Albanian state, as the Austrians did not want the Serbs to obtain access to the Adriatic, and the Italians did not want the Greeks to get to Valona or even to the north of Corfu. As opposed to this, Russia, as is known, was backing Serbia's wishes and France those of Greece.

My advice was to treat this question as outside the scope of the Alliance, and to support neither the Austrian nor the Italian claims. Without our aid it would have been impossible to set up an independent Albania, which, as anyone could foresee, had no prospect of surviving; Serbia would have extended to the sea, and the present world-war would have been avoided. France and Italy would have quarrelled over Greece, and if the Italians had not wanted to fight France unaided they would have been compelled to acquiesce in Greece's expansion to the north of Durazzo. The greater part of Albania is Hellenic. The towns in the south are entirely so; and during the Conference of Ambassadors delegations from principal towns arrived in London to obtain annexation to Greece. Even in present-day Greece there are Albanian elements and the so-called Greek national dress is of Albanian origin. The inclusion of the Albanians, who are principally Orthodox and Moslem, in the body of the Greek state was therefore the best and most natural solution, if you left Scutari and the north to the Serbs and Montenegrins. For dynastic reasons H.M. was also in favour of this solution. When I supported this view in a letter to the monarch I received agitated reproaches from the Chancellor; he said that I had the reputation of being "an opponent of Austria," and I was to abstain from such interference and direct correspondence.

THE NEAR EAST AND THE POLICY OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE.

We ought at last to have broken with the fatal tradition of pursuing a Triple Alliance policy in the Near East also, and have recognised our mistake, which lay in identifying ourselves in the south with the Turks and in the north with the Austro-Magyars. For the continuance of this policy, upon which we had entered at the Berlin Congress, and which we had actively pursued ever since, was bound to lead in time to a conflict with Russia and to the world-war, more especially if the requisite cleverness were lacking in high places. Instead of coming to terms with Russia on a basis of the independence of the Sultan, whom even Petrograd did not wish to eject from Constantinople, and of confining ourselves to our economic interests in the Near East and to the partitioning of Asia Minor into spheres of influence while renouncing any intention of military or political interference, it was our political ambition to dominate on the Bosphorus. In Russia they began to think that the road to Constantinople and the Mediterranean lay *via* Berlin. Instead of supporting the active development of the Balkan States—which, once liberated, are anything rather than Russian, and with which our experiences had been very satisfactory—we took sides with the Turkish and Magyar oppressors.

The fatal mistake of our Triple Alliance and Near East policy—which had forced Russia, our natural best friend and neighbour, into the arms of France and England and away from its policy of Asiatic expansion—was the more apparent, as a Franco-Russian attack, which was the *sole* hypothesis that justified a Triple Alliance policy, could be left out of our calculations.

The value of the Italian alliance needs no further reference. Italy will want our money and our tourists even after

the war, with or without an alliance. That this latter would fail us in case of war was patent beforehand. Hence the alliance had *no value*. Austria needs our protection in war, as in peace, and has no other support. Her dependence on us is based on political, national, and economic considerations, and is the greater the more intimate our relations with Russia are. The Bosnian crisis taught us this. Since the days of Count Beust no Vienna Minister has adopted such a self-confident attitude towards us as Count Aehrenthal during the later years of his life. If German policy is conducted on right lines, cultivating relations with Russia, Austria-Hungary is our vassal and dependent on us, even without an alliance or recompense; if it is wrongly conducted, then we are dependent on Austria. Hence there was *no reason* for the alliance.

I knew Austria too well not to be aware that a return to the policy of Prince Felix Schwarzenberg or Count Moritz Esterhazy was inconceivable there. Little as the Slavs there love us, just as little do they wish to return into a German Empire even with a Habsburg-Lorraine emperor at its head. They are striving for a federation in Austria on national lines, a state of things which would have even less chance of being realised within the German Empire than under the Double Eagle. The Germans of Austria, however, acknowledge Berlin as the centre of German Might and Culture, and are well aware that Austria can never again be the leading Power. They wish for as intimate a connection with the German Empire as possible, not for an anti-German policy.

Since the 'seventies the position has fundamentally changed in Austria, as in Bavaria. As, in the latter, a return to Great German separatism and old Bavarian policy is not to be feared, so with the former a resuscitation of the policy of Prince Kaunitz and Schwarzenberg was not to be expected. By a federation with Austria, however, which

resembles a big Belgium, since its population, even without Galicia and Dalmatia, is only about half Germanic, our interests would suffer as much as if we subordinated our policy to the views of Vienna or Budapest—thus espousing Austria's quarrels (*"d'épouser les querelles d'Autriche"*).

Hence we were not obliged to take any notice of the desires of our ally; they were not only unnecessary but also dangerous, as they would lead to a conflict with Russia if we looked at Oriental questions through Austrian spectacles.

The development of the alliance, from a union formed on a single hypothesis for a single specific purpose, into a general and unlimited association, a pooling of interests in all spheres, was the best way of producing what such a binding contract was designed to prevent—war. Such an "alliance policy" was also calculated to alienate from us the sympathies of the strong, young, rising communities in the Balkans, who were prepared to turn to us and to open their markets to us.

The difference between the power of a Ruling House and a National State, between dynastic and democratic ideas of government, had to be decided, and as usual we were on the wrong side.

King Carol told one of our representatives that he had entered into the alliance with us on the assumption that *we* retained the leadership; but if this passed to Austria, that would alter the foundations of the relationship, and under such circumstances he would not be able to go on with it.

Things were similar in Serbia, where, contrary to our own economic interests, we were supporting the Austrian policy of strangulation.

Every time we have backed the wrong horse, whose breakdown could have been foreseen: Krüger, Abdul Aziz, Abdul Hamid, Wilhelm of Wied, ending—the most fatal of all mistakes—with the great plunge on the Berchtold stable.

THE CONFERENCE OF AMBASSADORS.

Shortly after my arrival in London, at the end of 1912, Sir E. Grey proposed an informal conversation to prevent the Balkan War developing into a European one, after we had unfortunately refused, on the outbreak of the war, to agree to the French proposal of a declaration of disinterestedness. The British statesman from the very beginning took up the position that England had no interest in Albania, and had no intention of going to war over this question. He merely wished to mediate between the two groups as an "honest broker" and smooth over difficulties. He therefore by no means took sides with the Entente, and during the eight months or so of the negotiations his goodwill and his authoritative influence contributed in no small degree to the attainment of an agreement. We, instead of adopting an attitude similar to the English one, invariably took up the position which was prescribed for us by Vienna. Count Mensdorff was the leader of the Triple Alliance in London; I was his "second." It was my duty to support his proposals. That clever and experienced man Count Szögyenyi was conducting affairs in Berlin. His refrain was "Then the *casus fœderis* will arise," and when I once ventured to doubt the truth of this conclusion I was severely reprimanded for "Austrophobia." It was also said that I had an "hereditary weakness"—the allusion being to my father.

On all questions we took sides with Austria and Italy—about Albania, a Serbian port on the Adriatic, Scutari, and also about the delimitation of the frontiers of Albania—while Sir E. Grey hardly ever supported the French or Russian claims. He mostly supported our group in order not to give a pretext like the one a dead Archduke was to furnish later on. Thus with his assistance it was possible to coax King Nikita out of Scutari again. Otherwise this question would

already have led to a world-war, as we should certainly not have ventured to induce "our ally" to give way.

Sir E. Grey conducted the negotiations with circumspection, calm, and tact. When a question threatened to become involved, he sketched a formula for agreement which was to the point and was always accepted. His personality inspired equal confidence in all the participants.

As a matter of fact we had again successfully emerged from one of those trials of strength which characterise our policy. Russia had been obliged to give way to us on all points, as she was never in a position to procure success for the Serbian aims. Albania was established as a vassal state of Austria and Serbia was pressed back from the sea. Hence this conference resulted in a fresh humiliation for Russian self-esteem. As in 1878 and in 1908, we had opposed the Russian plans although no *German* interests were involved. Bismarck was clever enough to mitigate the mistake of the Congress by the secret treaty and by his attitude in the Battenberg question; but we continued to pursue in London the dangerous path, upon which we had once more entered in the Bosnian question, nor did we leave it in time when it led to the precipice.

The ill-humour which prevailed in Russia at that time was shown during the conference by attacks in the Russian Press against my Russian colleague and Russian diplomacy. The dissatisfied circles made capital of his German descent and Roman Catholicism, his reputation as a friend of Germany, and the accident that he was related both to Count Mensdorff and to me. Without possessing a very distinguished personality, Count Benckendorff is endowed with a number of qualifications that distinguish a good diplomat—tact, polished manners, experience, courtesy, and a natural eye for men and matters. He was always at pains to avoid a brusque attitude, and was supported in this by England and France.

Later I once remarked to him: "I presume that Russian feeling is very anti-German." He replied: "There are also very strong and influential pro-German circles, but in general people are anti-Austrian."

It is hardly necessary to add that our "Austrophilie à outrance" (friendship for Austria through thick and thin) was hardly calculated to loosen the Entente and to direct Russia towards her Asiatic interests!

THE BALKAN CONFERENCE.

At the same time the Balkan Conference was sitting in London and I had occasion to come into contact with the leaders of the Balkan States. M. Venizelos was certainly the most distinguished personality. At that time he was anything rather than anti-German, and visited me several times; he was especially fond of wearing the ribbon of the Order of the Red Eagle—he even wore it at the French Embassy. His prepossessing charm and ways of a man of the world secured him much sympathy. Next to him M. Daneff, at that time Bulgarian Premier and confidant of Count Berchtold, played a great part. He gave the impression of a subtle and energetic man, and it is probably only due to the influence of his Vienna and Budapest friends, of whose homage he often made fun, that he was induced to commit the folly of entering upon the second Balkan War and of refusing Russian arbitration.

M. Take Jonescu was also frequently in London and then visited me regularly. I knew him from the time when I was Secretary at Bucharest. He was also one of Herr von Kiderlen's friends. In London he was endeavouring to obtain concessions to Rumania from M. Daneff by means of negotiations, in which he was assisted by the very able Rumanian Ambassador Misu. It is known that Bulgarian opposition brought about the failure of these negotiations.

Count Berchtold (and we of course with him) was entirely on Bulgaria's side, otherwise by putting pressure on M. Daneff we might have secured the desired satisfaction for Rumania and placed her under an obligation to us; she was finally estranged from the Central Powers by Austria's attitude during and after the second Balkan War.

THE SECOND BALKAN WAR.

The defeat of Bulgaria in the second Balkan War and the victory of Serbia, with the Rumanian invasion, naturally constituted a humiliation for Austria. The plan to rectify this by an expedition against Serbia seems to have been evolved in Vienna soon after. The Italian revelations prove this, and it may be assumed that Marquis San Giuliano, who described the plan—most aptly—as a *pericolosissima avventura*, saved us from being involved in a world-war as early as the summer of 1913.

Owing to the intimacy of Russo-Italian relations, the Vienna plan was doubtless known in Petrograd. In any case, M. Sazonow openly declared at Constanza, as M. Take Jonescu told me, that an Austrian attack on Serbia would be a *casus belli* for Russia.

When one of my staff returned from leave in Vienna in the spring of 1914 he said that Herr von Tschirschky had declared that there would soon be war. As I, however, was always left in ignorance about important events I considered this pessimism to be unfounded.

As a matter of fact it would appear that, ever since the peace of Bucharest, Vienna was bent on securing a revision of the treaty by her own effort and was apparently only waiting for a favourable pretext. Vienna statesmen could, of course, depend on our support. They were aware of that, as they had been repeatedly accused of lack of firmness. In fact, Berlin was pressing for a "rehabilitation of Austria."

LIMAN VON SANDERS.

When I returned to London in December, 1913, from a lengthy leave, the Liman von Sanders question had led to a fresh crisis in our relations with Russia. Sir E. Grey, not without concern, pointed out to me the excitement there was in Petrograd over it: "I have never seen them so excited."

I received instructions from Berlin to request the Minister to exert a restraining influence in Petrograd, and to assist us in settling the dispute. Sir Edward gladly did this, and his intervention contributed in no small degree to smooth the matter over. My good relations with Sir Edward and his great influence in Petrograd were repeatedly made use of in similar manner when we wished to attain anything there, as our representative proved himself quite useless for such a purpose.

During the fateful days of July, 1914, Sir Edward said to me: "When you want to obtain anything in Petrograd you always apply to me, but if I appeal to you for your influence in Vienna you fail me."

THE COLONIAL TREATY.

The good and confidential relations which I had succeeded in establishing, not only with society and the most influential people like Sir E. Grey and Mr. Asquith, but also with the great public at public dinners, produced a marked improvement in the relations of the two countries. Sir Edward honestly tried to confirm this *rapprochement*, and his intentions were most apparent on two questions—the Colonial and the Bagdad Railway Treaties.

In 1898 Count Hatzfeld and Mr. Balfour had signed a secret agreement dividing the Portuguese colonies into economic spheres of influence between us and England. As the Government of Portugal had neither the power nor the means to open up her extended possessions or to administer

them properly, she had already thought of selling them before and thus relieving her financial burdens. An agreement had been come to between us and England which defined the interests of both parties, and which was of the greater value because Portugal is entirely dependent on England, as is generally known.

On the face of it this agreement was to safeguard the integrity and independence of the Portuguese State, and merely declared the intention of being of financial and economic assistance to the Portuguese. Literally, therefore, it did not contravene the ancient Anglo-Portuguese Alliance of the fifteenth century, which was last renewed under Charles II. and gave a reciprocal territorial guarantee.

In spite of this, owing to the endeavours of Marquis Soveral, who was presumably aware of the Anglo-German agreement, a new treaty—the so-called Treaty of Windsor—was concluded between England and Portugal in 1899, confirming the old agreements, which had always remained in force.

The object of negotiations between us and England, which had commenced before my arrival, was to amend and improve our agreement of 1898, as it had proved unsatisfactory on several points as regards geographical delimitation. Thanks to the accommodating attitude of the British Government I succeeded in making the new agreement fully accord with our wishes and interests. The whole of Angola up to the 20th degree of longitude was assigned to us, so that we stretched up to the Congo State from the south; we also acquired the valuable islands of San Thomé and Príncipe, which are north of the Equator and therefore really in the French sphere of influence, a fact which caused my French colleague to enter strong but unavailing protests.

Further, we obtained the northern part of Mozambique; the Licango formed the border.

The British Government showed the greatest consideration for our interests and wishes. Sir E. Grey intended to demonstrate his goodwill towards us, but he also wished to assist our colonial development as a whole, as England hoped to divert the German development of strength from the North Sea and Western Europe to the Ocean and to Africa. "We don't want to grudge Germany her colonial development," a member of the Cabinet said to me.

The British Government originally intended to include the Congo State in the agreement, which would have given us the right of pre-emption and enabled us to penetrate it economically. We refused this offer nominally in view of Belgian susceptibilities. Perhaps we wished to be economical of successes? With regard also to the practical realisation of its real though unexpressed intention—the later actual partition of the Portuguese colonies—the treaty in its new form showed marked improvements and advantages as compared with the old one. Cases had been specified which empowered us to take steps to guard our interests in the districts assigned to us. These were couched in such a manner that it was really left to us to decide when "vital" interests arose, so that, with Portugal entirely dependent on England, it was only necessary to cultivate further good relations with England in order to carry out our joint intentions at a later date with English assent.

Sir E. Grey showed the sincerity of the British Government's desire to respect our rights by referring to us Englishmen who wished to invest capital and asked for the support of the British Government in the districts assigned to us by the new agreement, even before this was completed and signed, and by informing them that their enterprise belonged to our sphere of influence.

The agreement was practically completed at the time of the King's visit to Berlin in May, 1913. At that time a

conference took place in Berlin under the presidency of the Imperial Chancellor; in this conference I also took part, and certain further wishes of ours were defined. On my return to London I succeeded, with the assistance of Councillor of Legation von Kühlmann, who was working at the agreement with Mr. Parker, in having our last proposals incorporated, so that the whole agreement could be initialled by Sir E. Grey and by me in August, 1913, before I went on leave.

But now fresh difficulties arose which prevented its being signed, and I did not obtain the authorisation to conclude it till a year later—that is, shortly before the outbreak of the war. It was, however, never signed.

Sir E. Grey was only willing to sign *if the agreement were published together with those of 1898 and 1899*. England had, as he said, no other secret treaties besides these, and it was contrary to established principles to keep binding agreements secret. Therefore he could not make any agreement without publishing it. He was, however, willing to accede to our wishes with regard to the time and manner of publication, provided that such publication took place within one year from the date of signature.

At our Foreign Office, where my London successes had caused increasing dissatisfaction, and where an influential personage, who acted the part of Herr von Holstein, wanted the London post for himself, I was informed that the publication would endanger our interests in the colonies, as the Portuguese would then not give us any more concessions.

The futility of this objection is apparent from the consideration that the Portuguese, in view of the closeness of Anglo-Portuguese relations, were most probably just as well aware of the old agreement as of our new arrangements, and that the influence which England possesses at Lisbon renders

their Government completely impotent in face of an Anglo-German agreement.

Another pretext had therefore to be found for wrecking the treaty. It was suggested that the publication of the Treaty of Windsor, which had been concluded during the time of Prince Hohenlohe—though it was only a renewal of the Treaty of Charles II., which had always remained in force—might endanger the position of Herr von Bethmann Hollweg, as a proof of British hypocrisy and perfidy!

I pointed out that the preamble of our agreement expressed the same thing as the Treaty of Windsor and as other similar treaties, namely, that we would protect the sovereign rights of Portugal and the inviolability of its possessions. In vain! In spite of repeated discussions with Sir E. Grey, at which he made many fresh suggestions for the publication, the Foreign Office persisted in its attitude, and finally arranged with Sir E. Goschen that matters should be left as they were!

The treaty, which offered us extraordinary advantages, the result of more than a year's work, was thus dropped because it would have been a public success for me.

When I mentioned the subject to Mr. Harcourt at a dinner at the Embassy in the spring of 1914, the Minister for the Colonies told me that he was placed in a difficult position, and did not know how to act. The present position was intolerable—he wished to safeguard our interests, but was in doubt whether he should proceed on the terms of the old or the new treaty. It was therefore urgently desirable to clear up the situation and to settle the matter, which had dragged on for such a long time.

In reply to a dispatch in this sense I received instructions couched in terms which showed more emotion than civility, telling me to abstain from any further interference in the matter.

I now regret that I did not immediately travel to Berlin and place my post at the disposal of the monarch, and that I had not lost faith in the possibility of arriving at an understanding with those in authority, a sinister mistake which was to take its revenge a few months later in such a tragical way.

However little I even then enjoyed the goodwill of the highest official of the Empire, as he feared that I was aspiring to his post, yet I must in justice to him say that during our last interview before the outbreak of war, at the end of June, 1914, to which I will refer later, he gave me his assent for the signature and publication of the treaty. In spite of this it required repeated applications on my part, which were supported by Herr Dr. Solf in Berlin, before sanction was finally obtained in July, 1914. As the Serbian crisis at that time already imperilled the peace of Europe, the completion of the treaty had to be postponed. It also is one of the sacrifices of this war.

THE BAGDAD TREATY.

At the same time I was negotiating in London, with the able support of Herr von Kühlmann, about the so-called Bagdad Treaty. The real object of this was to divide up Asia Minor into spheres of influence, although this term was anxiously avoided in view of the rights of the Sultan. Sir E. Grey also repeatedly stated that there were in existence no agreements with France and Russia about the partition of Asia Minor.

In consultation with a Turkish representative, Hakki Pasha, all economic questions concerning German undertakings were settled in the main according to the wishes of the Deutsche Bank. The most important concession Sir E. Grey made to me personally was the continuation of the

railway as far as Basra. We had dropped this point in favour of the connection to Alexandretta; up to that time Bagdad had been the terminal point of the railway. An international commission was to regulate navigation on the Shatt-el-Arab. We were also to have a share in the harbour works at Basra, and received rights for the navigation of the Tigris, which hitherto had been a monopoly of the firm of Lynch.

By this treaty the whole of Mesopotamia as far as Basra was included within our sphere of influence (without prejudice to already existing British navigation rights on the Tigris and the rights of the Wilcox irrigation works), as well as the whole district of the Bagdad and Anatolian railway.

The coast of the Persian Gulf and the Smyrna-Aidin railway were recognised as the British economic sphere, Syria as the French, and Armenia as the Russian. If both treaties were executed and published, an agreement with England would be reached which would preclude all doubts about the possibility of an "Anglo-German co-operation."

THE QUESTION OF THE NAVY.

The Naval question was and is the most delicate of all. It is not always regarded rightly.

The creation of a powerful fleet on the other side of the North Sea—the development of the greatest military power of the Continent into the greatest naval power as well—was bound to be felt in England as at least "inconvenient." There can be no doubt about this in any reasonable view. In order to maintain her advantage and not to become dependent, in order to secure the rule over the seas which is necessary for her if she is not to starve, she was compelled to undertake armaments and expenditure which weighed heavily on the taxpayer. England's international position would be threatened, however, if our policy created the

belief that warlike developments might ensue—a state of affairs which had almost been reached during the time of the Morocco crises and the Bosnian problem.

Great Britain had become reconciled to our fleet *within its then appointed limits*, but it was certainly not welcome, and was one of the causes—though not the only cause and perhaps not the most important—of her adhesion to France and Russia; but on account of the fleet *alone* England would not have drawn the sword any more than on account of our trade, which has been alleged to have produced jealousy and finally war.

From the very beginning I maintained that, *notwithstanding* the fleet, it would be possible to arrive at a friendly understanding and *rapprochement* if we did not introduce a new Navy Bill and *our policy were indubitably pacific*. I also avoided mention of the fleet and the word never passed between Sir E. Grey and me. On one occasion Sir E. Grey said at a meeting of the Cabinet, "The present German Ambassador has never mentioned the fleet to me."

During my tenure of office Mr. Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, proposed, as is known, the so-called "Naval holiday" and suggested for financial reasons, and probably also to meet the pacific wishes of his party, a year's pause in armaments. Officially Sir E. Grey did not support the proposal; he never mentioned it to me, but Mr. Churchill repeatedly spoke to me about it.

I am convinced that his suggestion was honest, as prevarication is altogether foreign to English nature. It would have been a great success for Mr. Churchill if he could have come before the country with reductions of expenditure and freed it from the nightmare of armaments that weighed on the people.

I replied that for technical reasons it would be difficult to agree to his plan. What was to become of the workmen

who were engaged for this purpose, and what of the technical staff? Our Naval programme had been decided on, and it would be difficult to alter it in any way. On the other hand we had no intention of exceeding it. But he reverted to it again and pointed out that the sums used for enormous armaments might better be employed for other and useful purposes. I replied that this expenditure too benefited our home industries.

Through interviews with Sir W. Tyrrell, Sir E. Grey's principal private secretary, I managed to have the question removed from the agenda without causing any ill-feeling, although it was again referred to in Parliament, and to prevent any official proposal being made. It was, however, a pet idea of Mr. Churchill's and the Government's, and I think that by entering upon his plan and the formula 16:10 for battleships we might have given tangible proof of our goodwill, and strengthened and encouraged the tendency (which already prevailed in the Government) to enter into closer relations with us.

But, as I have said, it was possible to arrive at an understanding *in spite of the fleet* and without a "Naval holiday." I had always regarded my mission from this point of view, and I had also succeeded in realising my plans when the outbreak of war destroyed everything I had achieved.

COMMERCIAL JEALOUSY.

The "commercial jealousy," about which we hear so much, is based on a wrong conception of the circumstances. Certainly Germany's rise as a commercial power after the war of 1870 and during the following decades was a menace to British commercial circles which, with their industries and export-houses, had held a virtual monopoly of trade. The increasing commerce with Germany, which was the leading country in Europe as regards British exports—a fact to which

I invariably referred in my public speeches—had, however, given rise to the wish to maintain friendly relations with their best customer and business friend, and had driven all other considerations into the background.

The Briton is matter-of-fact—he takes things as they are and does not tilt against windmills. Notably in commercial circles I encountered the most friendly spirit and the endeavour to further our common economic interests. As a matter of fact nobody in them took any interest in the Russian, Italian, Austrian, or even in the French representative, in spite of his striking personality and his political successes. Only the German and American Ambassadors attracted public attention.

In order to get into touch with important commercial circles, I accepted invitations from the United Chambers of Commerce, and from the London and Bradford Chamber, and was the guest of the cities of Newcastle and Liverpool. I was well received everywhere; Manchester, Glasgow, and Edinburgh had also invited me and I intended to go there later.

People who did not understand British conditions and did not realise the importance of "public dinners," also people to whom my successes were unwelcome, reproached me with having done harm with my speeches. I believe on the contrary that by appearing in public and emphasising common commercial interests I contributed in no small measure to the improvement of relations, quite apart from the fact that it would have been clumsy and churlish to refuse all invitations.

In all other circles I also met with the most friendly reception and hearty co-operation—at Court, in society, and from the Government.

THE COURT AND SOCIETY.

The King, although not a genius, is a simple and well-meaning man with sound common sense; he demonstrated

his goodwill towards me and was frankly desirous of furthering my task. Although the British Constitution leaves only very limited powers to the Crown, yet the monarch, in virtue of his position, can exercise a considerable influence on opinion both in society and in the Government. The Crown is the apex of the social pyramid; it sets the fashion. Society, which is principally Unionist (Conservative), has always taken an active interest in politics, a habit which the ladies share. It is represented in the House of Lords, the House of Commons, and hence also in the Cabinet. An Englishman either is a member of society, or he would like to be one. It is his constant endeavour to be a "Gentleman," and even people of undistinguished origin, like Mr. Asquith, delight to mingle in society and the company of beautiful and fashionable women.

The British gentlemen of both parties have the same education, go to the same colleges and universities, have the same recreations—golf, cricket, lawn-tennis, or polo. All have played cricket and football in their youth; they have the same habits of life, and spend the week-end in the country. There is no social cleavage between the parties, but only a political one; in recent years it has so far developed into a social cleavage that the politicians of the two camps avoid social intercourse with one another. Even on the neutral territory of an Embassy one did not venture to mingle the two parties, as since the Veto and Home Rule Bills the Unionists have ostracised the Radicals. When the King and Queen dined with us a few months after my arrival, Lord Londonderry left the house after dinner, as he did not wish to remain together with Sir E. Grey. But it is not a difference of caste or education as in France; they are not two separate worlds, but the same world, and the opinion about a foreigner is a common one, and not without influence on his political position, whether Mr. Asquith be governing or Lord Lansdowne.

There has been no difference of caste in England since the time of the Stuarts, and since the Guelphs and Whig oligarchy, in contrast to the Tory landed gentry encouraged the rise of an urban middle-class. It is rather a difference of political opinions about questions of constitutional law and taxation. Especially aristocrats like Grey, Churchill, Harcourt, Crewe, who joined the people's party—the Radicals—were most hated by the Unionist aristocracy; one never met any of these gentlemen at any of the great aristocratic houses, except at those of a few party friends.

We were received in London with open arms and both parties rivalled one another in courtesy towards us. In view of the close relationship between politics and society in England, it would be wrong to undervalue social relations, even when the majority of the upper ten thousand are in opposition to the Government.

There is not the same unbridgable gulf between Mr. Asquith and the Duke of Devonshire that there is between, say, M. Briand and the Duc de Doudeauville. Certainly they do not consort together in times of great tension; they belong to two separate social groups, but these are parts of the *same* society, though of different grades, the centre of which is the Court. They have common friends and habits of life; mostly they have known each other from their youth up and also are frequently related to one another either by blood or marriage.

Phenomena like Mr. Lloyd George—the man of the people, petty attorney, and self-made man—are the exception. Even Mr. Burns, the Socialist, Labour leader, and self-educated man, sought contact with society. In view of the prevailing attempt to rank as a gentleman, whose unattained prototype is still the great aristocrat, the value of the verdict of society and its attitude must not be underestimated.

Hence the social adaptability of a representative nowhere plays a greater rôle than in England. A hospitable house with pleasant hosts is worth more than the most profound scientific knowledge; a savant with provincial manners and small means would gain no influence, in spite of all his learning.

The Briton loathes a bore, a schemer, and a prig; he likes a good fellow.

SIR EDWARD GREY.

Sir Edward Grey's influence in all matters of foreign policy was almost unlimited. On important occasions he used indeed to say, "I must first bring it before the Cabinet"; but this always agreed to his views. His authority was undisputed. Although he does not know foreign countries at all, and had never left England except for a short visit to Paris, he was fully conversant with all the important questions owing to his long parliamentary experience and his natural insight. He understands French, but does not speak it. He was returned to Parliament as a young man, and soon began to interest himself in foreign affairs. Under Lord Rosebery he was Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and became Secretary of State in 1906, under Mr. Campbell-Bannerman; he has now held the post for some ten years.

The scion of an old north country family, which had already furnished Grey, the well-known statesman, he joined the left wing of his party and sympathised with Socialists and pacifists. You may call him a Socialist in the ideal sense, as he carries the theory into his private life and lives very simply and unpretentiously, although he has extensive means. Ostentation is foreign to him. In London he only had a small house, and never gave dinners, except the one official dinner at the Foreign Office on the King's

Birthday. On the few occasions when he entertained guests it was at a simple dinner or lunch with maidservants to wait. Also he avoided large functions and banquets.

Like his colleagues, he regularly spends his week-ends in the country, but not with large or fashionable parties. He is mostly by himself in his cottage in the New Forest, where he takes long walks to study birds and their ways, as he is a passionate lover of nature and an ornithologist. Or sometimes he goes to his estate in the north, where he feeds the squirrels that come in at the windows, and breeds different species of waterfowl.

He was very fond of going to the Norfolk marshes to watch in their breeding season the rare kinds of herons, which nest only there.

In his youth he was a well-known cricket and racquet player; now his favourite pastime is salmon and trout-fishing in Scottish rivers in company with his friend Lord Glenconner, Mr. Asquith's brother-in-law. "All the rest of the year I am looking forward to it." He has published a book on fishing.

On one occasion, when we spent a week-end with him alone at Lord Glenconner's, near Salisbury, he arrived on a bicycle and returned to his cottage about thirty miles distant in the same way.

The simplicity and honesty of his ways secured him the esteem even of his opponents, who were to be found rather in the sphere of home affairs than of foreign policy. Lies and intrigue are equally repugnant to him.

His wife, to whom he was devotedly attached and from whom he was inseparable, died in consequence of being thrown from a trap she was driving. As is generally known, one of his brothers was killed by a lion.

Wordsworth is his favorite poet, and he could quote much of his poetry.

The calm quiet of his British nature is not lacking in a sense of humour. Once when he was lunching with us and the children, and heard them talking German, he said, "I can't help thinking how clever these children are to talk German so well," and was pleased with his joke.

This is a true picture of the man who is decried as "Liar-Grey" and instigator of the world-war.

MR. ASQUITH.

Mr. Asquith is a man of an entirely different stamp. A jovial *bon-vivant*, fond of the ladies, especially the young and pretty ones, he is partial to cheerful society and good cooking; and his zest for enjoyment is shared by his wife. Formerly a well-known barrister with a large income, and for a number of years in Parliament, then a Minister under Mr. Gladstone, a pacifist like his friend Grey, and favouring an understanding with Germany, he treated all questions with the cheery calm and assurance of an experienced man of business, whose good health and excellent nerves were steeled by devotion to the game of golf.

His daughters were at school in Germany and spoke German fluently. In a short time we got on friendly terms with him and his family, and were his guests in his small country house on the Thames.

Only on rare occasions did he concern himself with foreign politics, when important questions arose; then of course his decision was final. During the critical days of July Mrs. Asquith repeatedly came to us to warn us, and in the end she was quite distraught at the tragic turn of events. Mr. Asquith also, when I called on him on the 2nd August to make a last effort in the direction of expectant neutrality, was quite broken, though absolutely calm. Tears were coursing down his cheeks.

NICOLSON.

Sir A. Nicolson and Sir W. Tyrrell were the two most influential men at the Foreign Office after the Minister. The former was no friend of ours, but his attitude towards me was absolutely correct and courteous. Our personal relations were excellent. He too did not want war; but when we advanced against France, he no doubt worked in the direction of an immediate intervention. He was the confidant of my French colleague, with whom he was in constant touch; also he wished to relieve Lord Bertie in Paris.

Sir Arthur, who had been Ambassador at Petrograd, had concluded the treaty of 1907, which had enabled Russia again to turn her attention to the West and to the Near East.

TYRRELL.

Sir W. Tyrrell, Sir Edward's private secretary, possessed far greater influence than the Permanent Under-Secretary. This highly intelligent man had been at school in Germany, and had then turned to diplomacy, but had only been abroad for a short time. At first he favoured the anti-German policy, which was then in fashion amongst the younger British diplomatists, but later he became a convinced advocate of an understanding. He influenced Sir E. Grey, with whom he was very intimate, in this direction. Since the outbreak of war he has left the Office and found a place in the Home Office, probably because of the criticisms passed on him for his Germanophil tendency.

ATTITUDE OF THE GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE.

Nothing can describe the rage of certain gentlemen at my London successes and the position which I had managed to make for myself in a short time. They devised vexatious

instructions to render my office more difficult. I was left in complete ignorance of the most important matters, and was restricted to the communication of dull and unimportant reports. Secret agents' reports, on matters about which I could not learn without espionage and the necessary funds, were never available to me; and it was not till the last days of July, 1914, that I learnt, quite by chance, from the Naval Attaché of the secret Anglo-French agreement concerning the co-operation of the two fleets in case of war. The knowledge of other important events which had been known to the Office for a long time, like the correspondence between Grey and Cambon, was kept from me.

IN CASE OF WAR.

Soon after my arrival I obtained the conviction that under *no* circumstances had we to fear a British attack or British support for any foreign attack, but that *under any circumstances England would protect the French*. I expressed this view in repeated dispatches, with minute proof and great emphasis, but did not obtain any credence, although Lord Haldane's refusal to assent to the neutrality formula and England's attitude during the Morocco crisis had been pretty obvious indications. In addition there were the secret agreements which I have referred to, and which were known to the Office.

I always pointed out that in the event of a war between European Powers, England as a commercial state would suffer enormously, and would therefore do her best to prevent a conflict; but, on the other hand, she would never tolerate a weakening or annihilation of France; because of the necessity of maintaining the European balance of power and of preventing a German superiority of force. Lord Haldane had told me this shortly after my arrival, and all the leading people had expressed themselves in the same sense.

THE SERBIAN CRISIS.

At the end of June I went to Kiel by command of the Emperor. A few weeks prior to this I had been made an honorary D.C.L. of Oxford, an honour which had not been conferred on any German Ambassador since Herr von Bunsen. On board the *Meteor* we learned of the death of the Archduke. H.M. regretted that his efforts to win him over to his way of thinking had thus been rendered vain. I do not know whether the plan of an active policy against Serbia had already been decided on at Konopischt.

As I was not instructed about views and events in Vienna, I did not attach very great importance to this occurrence. Later on I could only remark that amongst Austrian aristocrats a feeling of relief outweighed other sentiments. On board the *Meteor* there was also an Austrian guest of the Emperor's, Count Felix Thun. He had remained in his cabin all the time suffering from sea-sickness, in spite of the splendid weather; but on receiving the news he was well. The fright or joy had cured him.

On my arrival in Berlin I saw the Chancellor and told him that I considered the state of our foreign relations very satisfactory, as we were on better terms with England than we had been for a long time, whilst in France also the government was in the hands of a pacifist Ministry.

Herr von Bethmann Hollweg did not appear to share my optimism, and complained about Russian armaments. I sought to reassure him, emphasising the fact that Russia had no interest in attacking us, and that such an attack would never receive Anglo-French support, as both countries wanted peace. Thereupon I went to Dr. Zimmermann, who was acting for Herr von Jagow, and he told me that Russia was about to raise 900,000 additional troops. His language betrayed unmistakable annoyance with Russia,

which was "everywhere in our way." There were also difficulties in economic policy. Of course, I was not told that General von Moltke was pressing for war; but I learned that Herr von Tschirschky had been reprimanded because he reported that he had counselled moderation towards Serbia in Vienna.

On my return from Silesia to London I stopped only a few hours in Berlin, where I heard that Austria intended to take steps against Serbia in order to put an end to an impossible situation.

I regret that at the moment I underestimated the importance of the news. I thought that nothing would come of it this time either, and that matters could easily be settled, even if Russia became threatening. I now regret that I did not stay in Berlin and at once declare that I would not co-operate in a policy of this kind.

Subsequently I ascertained that, at the decisive conference at Potsdam on the 5th July, the Vienna enquiry received the unqualified assent of all the leading people, and with the rider that no harm would be done if a war with Russia should result. Thus it was expressed, at any rate, in the Austrian protocol which Count Mensdorff received in London. Soon afterwards Herr von Jagow was in Vienna to consult Count Berchtold about all these matters.

At that time I received instructions to induce the British Press to adopt a friendly attitude should Austria administer the *coup de grâce* to the "Great Serbia" movement, and to exert my personal influence to prevent public opinion from becoming inimical to Austria. If one remembered England's attitude during the annexation crisis, when public opinion showed sympathy for the Serbian rights in Bosnia, as well as her benevolent furtherance of national movements in the days of Lord Byron and Garibaldi, the probability that she would support the intended punitive expedition against the

murderers of the prince appeared so remote, that I found myself obliged to give an urgent warning. But I also warned them against the whole plan, which I characterised as adventurous and dangerous, and advised them to counsel the Austrians to *moderation*, as I did not believe that the conflict could be localised.

Herr von Jagow replied to me that Russia was not ready; there would probably be some fuss, but the more firmly we took sides with Austria the more would Russia give way. As it was, Austria was accusing us of weakness and therefore we dare not leave her in the lurch. Public opinion in Russia, on the other hand, was becoming more and more anti-German, so we must just risk it.

In view of this attitude, which, as I found later, was based on reports from Count Pourtalès that Russia would not move under any circumstances, and which caused us to spur Count Berchtold on to the utmost energy, I hoped for salvation through British mediation, as I knew that Sir E. Grey's great influence in Petrograd could be used in the direction of peace. I therefore availed myself of my friendly relations with the Minister to request him in confidence to advise moderation in Russia in case Austria, as seemed likely, demanded satisfaction from Serbia.

At first the English Press preserved calm and was friendly to Austria, because the murder was generally condemned. But gradually more and more voices were heard insisting emphatically that, however much the crime merited punishment, its exploitation for political purposes could not be justified. Austria was strongly exhorted to use moderation.

When the ultimatum was published, all the papers with the exception of the *Standard*—the ever-necessitous, which had apparently been bought by Austria—were unanimous in condemnation. The whole world, excepting Berlin and Vienna, realised that it meant war—indeed, "the world-war."

The British Fleet, which happened to have assembled for a naval review, was not demobilised.

My efforts were in the first place directed towards obtaining as conciliatory a reply from Serbia as was possible, since the attitude of the Russian Government left room for no doubts about the gravity of the situation.

Serbia responded favourably to the British efforts, as M. Pasitch had really agreed to everything, excepting two points, about which, however, he declared his willingness to negotiate. If Russia and England had wanted the war, in order to attack us, a hint to Belgrade would have been enough, and the unprecedented Note would not have been answered.

Sir E. Grey went through the Serbian reply with me, and pointed out the conciliatory attitude of the Government of Belgrade. Thereupon we discussed his proposal of mediation, which was to include a formula acceptable to both parties for clearing up the two points. His proposal was that a committee, consisting of M. Cambon, the Marquis Imperiali, and myself, should assemble under his presidency, and it would have been an easy matter for us to find an acceptable formula for the points at issue, which mainly concerned the collaboration of Austrian Imperial officials at the investigations in Belgrade. Given goodwill, everything could have been settled at one or two sittings, and the mere acceptance of the British proposal would have brought about a relaxation of the tension, and would have further improved our relations with England. I therefore strongly backed the proposal, on the ground that otherwise there was danger of the world-war, through which we stood to gain nothing and lose all; but in vain. It was derogatory to the dignity of Austria—we did not intend to interfere in Serbian matters—we left these to our ally. I was to work for “the localisation of the conflict.”

Needless to say a mere hint from Berlin would have decided Count Berchtold to content himself with a diplomatic success, and to accept the Serbian reply. This hint was not given; on the contrary they urged in the direction of war. It would have been such a splendid success.

After our refusal Sir Edward requested us to submit a proposal. We insisted on war. I could not obtain any reply but that Austria had shown an exceedingly "accommodating spirit" by not demanding an extension of territory.

Sir Edward rightly pointed out that even without an extension of territory it is possible to reduce a state to a condition of vassalage, and that Russia would see a humiliation in this, and would not suffer it.

The impression grew stronger and stronger that we wanted war under any circumstances. It was impossible to interpret our attitude, on a question which did not directly concern us, in any other way. The urgent requests and definite assurances of M. Sazonow, followed by the Czar's positively humble telegrams, the repeated proposals of Sir E. Grey, the warnings of the Marquis San Giuliano and Signor Bollati, my urgent counsels, all were of no avail. Berlin persisted; Serbia must be massacred.

The more I pressed the less were they inclined to come round, if only that I might not have the success of averting war in conjunction with Sir Edward Grey.

Finally, on the 29th, the latter decided on the famous warning. I replied that I had invariably reported that we should have to reckon with English opposition if it came to a war with France. Repeatedly the Minister said to me: "If war breaks out, it will be the greatest catastrophe the world has ever seen."

After that, events followed each other rapidly. When at last Count Berchtold, who up till then had, at the behest

of Berlin, played the strong man, decided to come round, we replied to the Russian mobilisation, after Russia had negotiated and waited for a whole week in vain, with the ultimatum and the declaration of war.

THE ENGLISH DECLARATION OF WAR.

Sir Edward was still looking for new ways of avoiding the catastrophe. Sir W. Tyrrell called on me on the morning of the 1st August to tell me that his chief still hoped to find a way out. Would we remain neutral if France did? I understood that we should then agree to spare France, but he had meant that we should remain altogether neutral—towards Russia also. That was the well-known “mis-understanding.” Sir Edward had asked me to call in the afternoon. As he was at a meeting of the Cabinet, he called me up on the telephone, Sir W. Tyrrell having hurried to him at once. In the afternoon, however, he talked only about Belgian neutrality and the possibility that we and France might face one another in arms without attacking.

Thus this was not a proposal at all, but a question without any guarantee, as our interview, which I have mentioned before, was to take place soon afterwards. Berlin, however, without waiting for the interview, made this report the foundation for far-reaching measures. Then there came M. Poincaré’s letter, Bonar Law’s letter, King Albert’s telegram. The waverers in the Cabinet—excepting three members who resigned—were converted.

Till the very last moment I had hoped that England would adopt a waiting attitude. Nor did my French colleague feel at all confident, as I heard from a private source. Even on the 1st August the King had given the President an evasive reply. But England was already mentioned as an opponent in the telegram from Berlin

announcing the imminent danger of war. Berlin was therefore already reckoning on war with England.

Before my departure Sir E. Grey received me, on the 5th, at his house. I had called at his request. He was deeply moved. He told me he would always be prepared to mediate. "We don't want to crush Germany." Unfortunately this confidential interview was made public, and Herr von Bethmann Hollweg thus destroyed the last chance of gaining peace through England.

The arrangements for our departure were perfectly dignified and calm. The King had previously sent his equerry, Sir E. Ponsonby, to express his regrets at my departure and that he could not see me himself. Princess Louise wrote to me that the whole family were sorry we were leaving. Mrs. Asquith and other friends came to the Embassy to take leave.

A special train took us to Harwich, where a guard of honour was drawn up for me. I was treated like a departing Sovereign. Such was the end of my London mission. It was wrecked, not by the wiles of the British, but by the wiles of our policy.

Count Mensdorff and his staff had come to the station in London. He was cheerful, and gave me to understand that perhaps he would remain there, but he told the English that we, and not Austria, had wanted the war.

RETROSPECT.

Looking back after two years, I come to the conclusion that I realised too late that there was no room for me in a system that for years had lived on routine and traditions alone, and that only tolerated representatives who reported what their superiors wished to read. Absence of prejudice and an independent judgment are resented. Lack of ability

and want of character are praised and esteemed, while successes meet with disfavour and excite alarm.

I had given up my opposition to the insane Triple Alliance policy, as I realised that it was useless, and that my warnings were attributed to "Austrophobia," to my *idée fixe*. In politics, which are neither acrobatics nor a game of red tape, but the main business of the firm, there is no "phil" or "phobe," but only the interest of the community. A policy, however, that is based only on Austrians, Magyars, and Turks must come into conflict with Russia, and finally lead to a catastrophe.

In spite of former mistakes, all might still have been put right in July, 1914. An agreement with England had been arrived at. We ought to have sent a representative to Petrograd who was at least of average political capacity, and to have convinced Russia that we wished neither to control the straits nor to strangle Serbia. "*Lâchez l'Autriche et nous lâcherons les Français*" ("Drop Austria and we will drop the French"), M. Sazonow said to us. And M. Cambon told Herr von Jagow, "*Vous n'avez pas besoin de suivre l'Autriche partout*" ("You need not follow Austria everywhere").

We wanted *neither wars nor alliances*; we wanted only treaties that would safeguard us and others, and secure our economic development, which was without its like in history. If Russia had been freed in the West, she could again turn to the East, and the Anglo-Russian rivalry would have been re-established automatically and without our intervention, and not less certainly also the Russo-Japanese.

We could also have considered the question of the reduction of armaments, and need no longer have troubled ourselves about Austrian complications. Then Austria would have become the vassal of the German Empire, without any alliance—and especially without our seeking her

good graces, a proceeding ultimately leading to war for the liberation of Poland and the destruction of Serbia, although German interest demanded the exact contrary.

I had to support in London a policy the heresy of which I recognised. That brought down vengeance on me, because it was a sin against the Holy Ghost.

MY RETURN.

As soon as I arrived in Berlin I saw that I was to be made the scapegoat for the catastrophe for which our Government had made itself responsible against my advice and warnings.

The report was deliberately circulated in official quarters that I had allowed myself to be deceived by Sir E. Grey, because, if he had not wanted war, Russia would not have mobilised. Count Pourtalés, whose reports could be relied on, was to be protected, not least on account of his relationship. He had conducted himself "magnificently," he was praised enthusiastically, and I was blamed the more severely.

"What does Serbia matter to Russia?" this statesman said to me after eight years in office at Petrograd. The whole thing was a British trick that I had not noticed. At the Foreign Office they told me that war would in any case have come in 1916. Then Russia would have been ready; therefore it was better now.

THE QUESTION OF RESPONSIBILITY.

As is evident from all official publications—and this is not refuted by our White Book, which, owing to the poverty of its contents and to its omissions, is a gravely self-accusing document—

1. We encouraged Count Berchtold to attack Serbia, although German interests were not involved and the danger of a world-war must have been known

to us. Whether we were aware of the wording of the Ultimatum is completely immaterial.

2. During the time between the 23rd and 30th July, 1914, when M. Sazonow emphatically declared that he would not tolerate any attack on Serbia, we rejected the British proposals of mediation, although Serbia, under Russian and British pressure, had accepted almost the whole of the Ultimatum, and although an agreement about the two points at issue could easily have been reached, and Count Berchtold was even prepared to content himself with the Serbian reply.

3. On the 30th July, when Count Berchtold wanted to come to terms, we sent an ultimatum to Petrograd merely because of the Russian mobilisation, although Austria had not been attacked; and on the 31st July we declared war on Russia, although the Czar pledged his word that he would not order a man to march as long as negotiations were proceeding—thus deliberately destroying the possibility of a peaceful settlement.

In view of the above undeniable facts it is no wonder that the whole of the civilised world outside Germany places the entire responsibility for the world-war upon our shoulders.

THE ENEMY POINT OF VIEW.

Is it not intelligible that our enemies should declare that they will not rest before a system is destroyed which is a constant menace to our neighbours? Must they not otherwise fear that in a few years' time they will again have to take up arms and again see their provinces overrun and their towns and villages destroyed? Have not they proved to be right who declared that the spirit of Treitschke and Bern-

hardi governed the German people, that spirit which glorified war as such, and did not loathe it as an evil, that with us the feudal knight and Junker, the warrior caste, still rule and form ideals and values, not the civilian gentleman; that the love of the duel which animates our academic youth still persists in those who control the destinies of the people? Did not the Zabern incident and the parliamentary discussions about it clearly demonstrate to foreign countries the value we place on the rights and liberties of the citizen if these collide with questions of military power?

That intelligent historian Cramb, who has since died, an admirer of Germany, clothed the German conception in the words of Euphorion:

Dream ye of peace?*

Dream he that will—

War is the rallying cry!

Victory is the refrain.

Militarism, which by rights is an education for the people and an instrument of policy, turns policy into the instrument of military power when the patriarchal absolutism of the soldier-kingdom makes possible an attitude which a democracy, remote from military Junker influence, would never have permitted.

So think our enemies, and so they must think when they see that, in spite of capitalistic industrialisation and in spite of socialist organisation, "the living are still ruled by the dead," as Friedrich Nietzsche says. The principal war aim of our enemies, the democratisation of Germany, will be realised!

BISMARCK.

Bismarck, like Napoleon, loved conflict for itself. As a statesman he avoided fresh wars, the folly of which he recognised. He was content with bloodless battles. After

*The original has "war," presumably owing to a misprint.—TRANSLATER

he had, in rapid succession, vanquished Christian, Francis Joseph, and Napoleon, it was the turn of Arnim, Pius, and Augusta. That did not suffice him. Gortschakow, who thought himself the greater, had repeatedly annoyed him. The conflict was carried almost to the point of war—even by depriving him of his railway saloon. This gave rise to the miserable Triple Alliance. At last came the conflict with William, in which the mighty one was vanquished, as Napoleon was vanquished by Alexander.

Political life-and-death unions only prosper if founded on a constitutional basis and not on an international one. They are all the more questionable if the partner is feeble. Bismarck never meant the Alliance to take this form.

He always treated the English with forbearance; he knew that this was wiser. He always paid marked respect to the old Queen Victoria, despite his hatred of her daughter and of political Anglomania; the learned Beaconsfield and the wordly-wise Salisbury he courted; and even that strange Gladstone, whom he did not like, really had nothing to complain about.

The Ultimatum to Serbia was the culminating point of the policy of the Berlin Congress, the Bosnian crisis, the Conference of London: but there was yet time to turn back.

We were completely successful in achieving that which above all other things should have been avoided—the breach with Russia and England.

OUR FUTURE.

After two years' fighting it is obvious that we dare not hope for an unconditional victory over the Russians, English, French, Italians, Rumanians, and Americans, or reckon on being able to wear our enemies down. But we can obtain a peace by compromise only by evacuating the occupied

territory, the retention of which would in any event be a burden and cause of weakness to us, and would involve the menace of further wars. Therefore everything should be avoided which would make it more difficult for those enemy groups who might possibly still be won over to the idea of a peace by compromise to come to terms, viz., the British Radicals and the Russian Reactionaries. From this point of view alone the Polish scheme is to be condemned, as is also any infringement of Belgian rights, or the execution of British citizens—to say nothing of the insane U-boat plan.

“Our future lies on the water.” Quite right; therefore it is not in Poland and Belgium, in France and Serbia. This is a return to the days of the Holy Roman Empire and the mistakes of the Hohenstaufens and Habsburgs. It is the policy of the Plantagenets, not that of Drake and Raleigh, Nelson and Rhodes. The policy of the Triple Alliance is a return to the past, a turning aside from the future, from imperialism and a world-policy. “Middle Europe” belongs to the Middle Ages, Berlin-Bagdad is a blind alley and not the way into the open country, to unlimited possibilities, to the world-mission of the German nation.

I am no enemy of Austria, or Hungary, or Italy, or Serbia, or any other state, but only of the Triple Alliance policy, which was bound to divert us from our aims and bring us onto the inclined plane of a Continental policy. It was not the German policy, but that of the Austrian Imperial House. The Austrians had come to regard the Alliance as an umbrella under the shelter of which they could make excursions to the Near East when they thought fit.

And what must we expect as the result of this war of nations? The United States of Africa will be British, like those of America, Australia and Oceania. And the Latin states of Europe, as I predicted years ago, will enter into the

same relations with the United Kingdom that their Latin sisters in America maintain with the United States. The Anglo-Saxon will dominate them. France, exhausted by the war, will only attach herself still more closely to Great Britain. Nor will Spain continue to resist for long.

And in Asia the Russians and the Japanese will spread and will carry their customs with their frontiers, and the South will remain to the British.

The world will belong to the Anglo-Saxons, Russians, and Japanese, and the German will remain alone with Austria and Hungary. His rule will be that of thought and of commerce, not that of the bureaucrat and the soldier. He made his appearance too late, and his last chance of making good the past, that of founding a Colonial Empire, was annihilated by the world-war.

For we shall not supplant the sons of Ichwe. Then will be realised the plan of the great Rhodes, who saw the salvation of humanity in the expansion of Britondom—in British Imperialism.

Tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento.
Hae tibi erunt artes: pacisque imponere morem,
Parcere subjectis et debellare superbos.

SEARCH-LIGHTS ON THE WAR

BY

DR. BERNHARD DERNBURG

Former Colonial Secretary of the German Empire

GERMANY AND ENGLAND — THE REAL ISSUE

• ENGLAND'S SHARE OF GUILT

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ENGLISH "WHITE BOOK"

GERMANY AND THE POWERS

THE TIES THAT BIND AMERICA AND GERMANY

GERMANY'S FOOD SUPPLY

WHEN GERMANY WINS

NEW YORK

THE FATHERLAND CORPORATION

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1915

GERMANY AND ENGLAND—THE REAL ISSUE

(From "*The Saturday Evening Post*")

As everybody knows, the trouble that led to the present world-war started in a little corner in the southeast of Europe, and it is remarkable to see how, in spite of this common knowledge, in the eyes of the world the European conflict has resolved itself into a question between Germany and England as to supremacy in Europe. Of course England claims that she went to war on account of the breach of Belgian neutrality and that she must fight to destroy the spirit of militarism that has led to such a flagrant disregard of solemn treaties, a tendency that is endangering the peace of the world and consequently must be crushed entirely. While England fosters no ill feeling whatsoever and no antagonism toward the good people of Germany, unfortunately, in order to crush militarism, led by the Emperor and the military caste, the German people will have to be destroyed as a nation, reducing what is left to the size of a subordinate Power. For this purpose England has created in her literary arsenal a special docket called German Militarism, with the works of Von Bernhardi, Treitschke, and Nietzsche as the main exhibits.

How Germany Has Kept the Peace

It is interesting to note the number of copies of the books of these three men that were sold in America before the beginning of the war. I dare say there were not twenty of the works of any one of them in the hands of Americans, outside of clubs and public libraries. Von Bernhardi is the chief witness for the prosecution. He is a retired German general of great learning, independent views, and strong personality. His book makes interesting reading. Yet he is not among the German generals in the present war, having been retired from the service just because his writings and sayings did not meet with the approval of his superiors and because his teachings were considered very extravagant. His book has excited some comment also in Germany, but it has been printed in only two editions, and certainly never more than ten thousand copies in all have been sold in our country. The book appeared in 1911, a little over two and a half years ago, and I fail to see how it can have created the feeling of militarism that is said to have been predominant in Germany for the last thirty years. I further fail to see how a book that is obviously written to warn the German people against existing dangers; to rouse in them a warlike spirit; to teach

them the ethics of war and the rights of the stronger, can be used to prove that such a spirit of war was rampant in Germany. If it already existed, there was no need to write such a book!

There are Von Bernhardis in all countries. I refrain from citing American examples, because I have made it a rule in this country not to fall back on them. The feeling of obligation I have as a guest of the United States does not permit me to become personal. But what about Lord Charles Beresford, who, together with Captain Faber, has for years and years been egging on the English to increase the British Navy, at a great sacrifice to the country? What about Lord Roberts's writings and sayings for years back that England must have universal conscription and a compulsory service? What about Senator Humbert, who has vigorously denounced the French ministry for neglecting the defense of the country? Did they teach anything different from Von Bernhardi's teachings? I cannot see it.

Then about Treitschke. He was a professor of history and the historian of the Prussian Government. His ideas were formed from a lifelong study of this history. He hated England sincerely and thoroughly for the way in which she had conquered her Empire, by using might versus right; but his conferences were mainly attended on account of his refined rhetoric, for he was indeed an orator of the first order. But from being an orator to having an influence on the German people as a whole is a very far cry, and Treitschke's preachings of twenty years ago have not even formed a school. You might just as well say that it can be proven that America is a warlike nation because a celebrated Harvard professor at a later day impressed upon his women audience to go into war and help the Allies. If that were presented to the world as a proof of the American spirit there would be a very energetic protest.

And now I come to Nietzsche: He was one of the finest of poetical philosophers, or perhaps rather a philosophizing poet. His teaching of the right of the individual as the basis of all right is in direct contradiction to Von Bernhardi's teaching that the right of the collectivity—that is, of the State—is paramount to the right of the citizen as an individual. How, therefore, can it be said that Von Bernhardi is a disciple of Nietzsche?

The expression "superman" is universally attributed to Nietzsche. This is just as incorrect as it is to cite the German song "Deutschland, Deutschland Ueber Alles" as a proof of the world-wide aspirations of my people. Superman, in German *Uebermensch*, is a word coined by Goethe and used repeatedly in his "Faust," and so one might just as well lay the present war to the door of Goethe.

The absurdity of the thing is patent, and those who cite "Deutschland, Deutschland Ueber Alles" in proof of German aspirations do not know even the first lines of this song so dear to the Germans. It is a song of modesty and shows better the tendencies of the German nation than anything else could:

Germany, Germany above everything, above everything in the world.
May her sons ever stand united for defense and protection
From the Maas unto the Memel,
From the Etsch unto the Belt,
Germany, Germany above everything, above everything in the world.

Now the Maas is part of the western frontier of my home country and the Memel part of the eastern frontier, and so are the Etsch in the south and the Belt in the north. Could a patriotic song be more modest? You may compare it with your own saying that the United States is the finest country in the world. The meaning is the same. Everybody praises his country and loves it best. And is "Rule Britannia" without aspiration, without pretensions?

And just as our national anthem is cited, so is our militarism. It has been created as a dire necessity for the defense of our four frontiers and has never been used beyond them. If every country could stand on so good a record as Germany there would not be so much cant about the reasons for the present war. It has been stated that militarism in general is a threat to the peace of the world. Yet German militarism has kept the peace for forty-four years. While Russia went to war with Turkey and China, and, after having promoted The Hague Conference, battled with Japan, and "protected" Persia, conquering territory double the size of the United States on the might-is-right principle; while England, the defender of the rights of the small States, smashed the Boer Republics, took Egypt, Cyprus, and south Persia; while the French Republic conquered the Sudan, Tunis, Madagascar, Indo-China, and Morocco; while Italy possessed itself of Tripoli and the islands in the Ægean Sea; while Japan fought China, took Formosa, Korea, and southern Manchuria, and has now with the aid of her allies invaded China, a neutral country—there is not one annexation or increase of territory to the charge of Germany. She has waged no war of any kind, has never acquired a territory in all her existence except by treaty and with the consent of the rest of the world.

The Battle-Ground of All Europe

But why, then, did she keep up such a tremendous army? Certainly not for aggressive purposes. She never was aggressive toward anybody. She needed this army because her exposed situation in the middle of Europe, without natural boundaries, between unsettled neighbors, has made her for ages and centuries the cockpit and the battle-ground of all Europe. Her soil was drenched with blood and her population nearly exterminated in the Thirty Years' War; Louis XIV. in the Palatinate left hardly one stone on the other, destroyed old Heidelberg and took Alsace and Lorraine, then a German-speaking dukedom; the devastations of the Seven Years' War, the battles and six years' occupation of the Napoleonic times, all taught Germany bitter lessons. Her soil has been the rendezvous of Swedes, Danes, Russians, Croats, Poles, Italians, French, and Spaniards for cen-

turies past. Impotent and not able to ward them off, she has been continually destroyed, until the genius of Bismarck welded her twenty-six States together into one unit, and Germany made the vow that she would never again give any one such chances. That is why we kept our army, and if a people have an army at all, it is a waste not to make it strong enough for any emergency. That it is not too strong may be judged from the fact that Germany is now attacked by seven nations.

You hear people say that the large standing establishment, the enormous cost of it, and the time wasted, is a sin against culture, advancement, and scientific progress. The Germany of to-day proves the contrary. While we have been keeping up a big army—which, by the way, is the cheapest of the European armies so far as the taxpayer is concerned—we have increased our population, we have enormously increased our wealth, we have built up a gigantic oversea trade, we have constructed the second largest merchant marine in the world. More, we have been able to spend as much as \$250,000,000 a year to take care of our workmen, giving them a compulsory insurance against sickness and invalidism, accident, and old age, pensioning widows and providing for orphans. Every German employee earning less than 5,000 marks a year can with a degree of security look forward to a comfortable provision for himself and for the people dear to him when his own forces fail. We pay yearly more for this social work than we ever paid for our army.

And our productive and inventive genius has not suffered. I do not say that Germany's civilization is superior to that of England and France; it certainly is superior to the civilization of any of the other warring nations. We have been able to give our people a primary and technical education of the first order, and that in turn has led to the perfection of scientific work and to inventions that are a comfort to all the world. Germany stands in the first rank in applied science, be it in chemistry, or electricity, or in the perfection of medicines. With just pride the Germans provide a great many absolute necessities of life to a very large part of the world. While the population has increased 50 per cent., the wealth of the nation is now three times what it was before, and thanks to our democratic government the repartition of this wealth is such that we have a well-to-do middle class and few colossal fortunes; and the number of really poor people in Germany is infinitely small in comparison with other countries.

This is the story of German militarism, unaggressive and certainly not unproductive, based on actual facts. Those antagonistic to our nation say it has created a warlike spirit, and that such a spirit by itself is a danger. This warlike spirit is generally shown by people going to war; and yet of all the European peoples Germany alone did not do that.

The case of Belgium is frequently cited as proving Germany's reckless warlike spirit. It is said we have broken wantonly most solemn treaties, and therefore we ought to be punished for it. The question as to the right—so far as obligations under treaties go—has been decided by nearly all

nations in the same spirit—namely, *that no nation can bind itself by a treaty to its own destruction*, just as no individual can so bind himself by contract; that the national interest supersedes the international interest, and that treaties are closed on the basis of circumstances existing at the time they are made, and that therefore they are not binding when those circumstances change.

Treaties That Are Not Binding

England, who claims to have gone to war on account of the breach of Belgium's neutrality, has never hesitated to break her obligations whenever she considered doing so of paramount interest. She has done so in this war any number of times. There is a treaty of peace and amity between Germany and Portugal which is to be broken on England's bidding. There is the Triple Alliance, which is to be severed at English solicitation. Egypt is a sovereign State, where the rights of the foreigner are guaranteed by solemn pledges, yet the Khedive had to banish the German Minister and even the judges of the mixed tribunal at England's command. China is a neutral country and bound to the open-door policy by international treaties; she has been invaded by the Allies in breach of these treaties. Morocco has pacts binding England as well as Germany, regulating the rights of the foreigners; yet the German diplomatic representative has been chased out of the country.

When Sir Edward Grey expounded the European situation before the English Parliament he cited Gladstone in regard to Belgium—Gladstone, who said that the maintenance of the obligations of a treaty without regard to changed circumstances was an impracticable, stringent proposition to which he could not adhere; and when England seized two Turkish dreadnoughts on the Tyne on August 8, she proclaimed the fact with the following words: "In accordance with the recognized principle of the right and supreme duty to assure national safety in times of war." France has been doing the same in Morocco; and Japan, when she sent to the German Consul in Mukden—a Chinese city in Manchuria—his passports, acted on the same principle, leaving aside all her other infractions on Chinese treaties and rights.

This is sad and does not portend well for the permanent peace by arrangement of international affairs through treaties; yet it seems that it can not be helped. The United States Supreme Court says in a judgment rendered in 1889, written by Judge Field, expressing the unanimous conviction of the whole court: "Circumstances may arise which would not only justify the Government in disregarding their treaty stipulations, but demand in the interest of the country that it should do so. There can be no question that unexpected events may call for a change of the policy of the country." This judgment was handed down when the Chinese were excluded from the United States in violation of a previous treaty which had assured them the same rights as United States citizens; and the United States has acted on the quoted decision ever since.

The Case of Belgium

It is, therefore, universally recognized that the vital interests of a country supersede its treaty obligations. But though this is the theoretic side of the question, there is a practical one as regards Belgium: When the war broke out there was no enforceable treaty in existence to which Germany was a party. Originally, in 1839, a treaty was concluded providing for such neutrality. In 1866, France demanded of Prussia the right to take possession of Belgium, and the written French offer was made known by Bismarck in July, 1870. Then England demanded and obtained separate treaties with France and with the North-German Federation to the effect that they should respect Belgium's neutrality, and such treaties were signed on the 9th and 26th of August, 1870, respectively. According to them both countries guaranteed Belgium's neutrality *for the duration of the war and for one year thereafter*. The war came to an end with the Frankfurt Peace in 1871, and the treaty between Belgium and the North-German Federation expired in May, 1872.

Why the new treaties, if the old one held good? The Imperial Chancellor has been continuously misrepresented as admitting that in the case of Belgium a treaty obligation was broken. What he said was that the neutrality of Belgium could not be respected and that we were sincerely sorry that Belgium, a country that in fact had nothing to do with the question at issue and might wish to stay neutral, had to be overrun. But it should not be forgotten that the offer of indemnity to Belgium and the full maintenance of her sovereignty had been made not only once but even a second time after the fall of Liège, and that it would have been entirely possible for Belgium to avoid all the devastation under which she is now suffering.

England takes the position that in case France had used Belgium as a stepping-stone, England would have gone to war against France for breaking the Belgian neutrality. This is a remarkable proposition. On July 30, the Belgian *chargé d'affaires* at St. Petersburg wrote to his Government—and the authenticity of this letter can not be impeached—that the Russian war-party got the upper hand upon England's assurance that she would stand in with France. This was written before the Belgian question ever came up; and before Sir Edward Grey expounded in Parliament the Belgian question, he insisted that England was obliged to protect the French coast against Germany because of the amity and friendship existing between the two nations. He then read the correspondence of 1912 between himself and the French Minister of War, where the arrangement is alluded to that the French fleet should protect the Mediterranean Sea and the English fleet the northern coast of France. So in consequence of this, Sir Edward Grey insisted to Count Lichnowsky that the maintenance of Belgium's neutrality *alone* would not keep England from going to war, but that, if France should be attacked, England would aid her.

I wish an intelligent American reader to picture to himself a situation

where England protects the French coast against Germany and goes to war against France for breach of Belgian neutrality.

But Belgium was not neutral at all any more, and with her circumstances had greatly changed. Even since 1906 she had been in correspondence with England, elaborating plans for a common defense, providing for the landing of a hundred thousand English at Antwerp. She had been in correspondence with France, building fortresses all along the German frontier, which form a continuous chain with the French fortresses along that same frontier. She had been changing her military system to a system of compulsory conscription, establishing an army of more than three hundred thousand men, creating—on English instigation—a spy system on her eastern frontier, acquiring enormous oversea possessions of nine hundred thousand square miles, an area three times as great as Germany and populated by nine million inhabitants. This acquisition, by the way, was also obtained by breach of treaty.

Belgian population at home is bigger by one-half than that of Portugal. Though Belgium left her frontiers toward France entirely unprotected and open, she was actively preparing to make a stand against Germany. This is not the "poor little country" that is being pictured to the Americans. I think the Belgian fighting, which she has had to do almost quite alone against a large part of the German forces, should fully prove that.

But she did more. The Imperial Chancellor said that he had proofs that the French were to invade Germany by way of Belgium. Proof there is. French soldiers and French guns, in spite of all the denials made by the French Ambassador at Washington, were in Liège and Namur before the 30th of July. Certainly this proof is only in private letters, but it comes from absolutely unimpeachable people. Of course it is not in the White Books, such as are held up as evidence of the purest water.

But do Americans believe all the "official news" that the Russians are sending continuously from the seat of war as to their enormous successes, the routing of the Austrians, the destruction of their whole army, the march on Vienna and Berlin, and so forth? I do not think they do; but why then place an implicit faith on so-called White Books, written by identically the same people? Such books are written for the purpose of making out a nation's case, and they are the diplomatic war weapons used in the war of diplomatists that always precedes the war at arms.

There is a great deal of talk of crushing Germany, and the necessity for it, because of her military spirit. I confess we are a manly people, and want to be strong and want to be secure. We want to live and to thrive, and are ready to pay for our civic liberty and national independence with our blood. And we should despise a nation that did not feel the same way.

Safety for the Monroe Doctrine

The case of England is different. Though she wants to be free and independent, she has always managed to have her fighting done for her by

others, from the time she trafficked in Hessians, and that is why she has not had a standing army such as Lord Roberts and his friends have always demanded. Though there is a fighting spirit in the English Army, it is mostly Irish, and so are the leaders—Lord Roberts, Lord Beresford, Sir John French, Admiral Jellicoe, and Lord Kitchener of Khartum. The way in which she cares for the little nations whose interests she has so much at heart is to allow her fighting to be done by the Belgians, of whom Sir Edward Grey said that he expected them to fight to the last man for the independence of the country. And so she called in the Canadians, who should have much better things to do; and she made a treaty with Portugal to help her—the Portuguese, who do not know what the conflict is about. She brings over ambitious Indian princes and poor ignorant Indian soldiers to fight against the white men; she relies on Japan and she gets the Boers to attack the German possessions; she tries to persuade Italy to do some fighting for her. Most of these are “poor little States,” who now are expected to fight for the sovereignty and independence of Great Britain. In this way she has time left to talk at home and to force the unemployed into a new army that is going to be created. That she too must become militaristic she now finds out to her surprise and grief.

The fact that Canada has taken part in this struggle has opened up a new prospective to Americans. It is a wilful breach of the Monroe Doctrine for an American self-governing dominion to go to war, thereby exposing the American Continent to a counter-attack from Europe and risking to disarrange the present equilibrium. But I think America can set her mind at rest on that point. I at least would most emphatically say that no matter what happens the Monroe Doctrine will not be violated by Germany either in North America or in South America. When she is victorious there will be enough property of her antagonists lying about over the four parts of the globe to keep Germany from the necessity of looking any farther, and causing trouble where she seeks friendship and sympathy.

While England in the Venezuelan case of 1895 most coolly challenged the Monroe Doctrine, it was Germany in 1904, in a similar case, also with Venezuela, who submitted her claim in Washington and got the consent of the United States Government to prosecute the collection. Moreover, I am in the position to state here that immediately after the outbreak of the war, by one of the first mails that reached the United States, the German Government sent of its own free initiative a solemn declaration to the Department of State that whatever happened she would fully respect the Monroe Doctrine.

The Dangers of Navyism

I wish also to make clear to the American people that Germany neither wanted nor started this war, which had its origin in Russia's pretensions to mix in Austrian affairs, and that got its size from the fact that England and France joined the conflict, the latter from treaty obligations, the former

from self-interest, and that *we have no ambitions of enlargement in Europe or in America*. Modern democracies, and especially the German one, which is directed by the most liberal ballot law that exists, even more liberal than the one in use in the United States, rest at least in Europe on a national basis.

We do not believe in incorporating in our Empire any parts of nations that are not of our own language and race. The history of Europe has shown us the danger of such a thing. The difficulties between France and Germany are over the French-speaking population in Lorraine; the small internal differences in Germany came because of some millions of Poles and thirty thousand Danes; the trouble between Austria and Italy is because of a few hundred thousand Italian-speaking people under Austrian government. England had what nearly amounted to a civil war because of Ireland. The trouble in Russia is on account of the Poles, Finns, and Baltic Germans; and Austria, the country of many nations, is not very strong just for this very reason. And as to oversea possessions, as I said before, there are enough to be had without borrowing trouble; especially in Africa, where considerable parts of land lend themselves to colonization by the white man.

Even there our ambitions do not go very far and we are quite content with what we have, and with our spheres of influence in Mesopotamia, and some countries such as Morocco, that a civilized nation with great resources and inventive genius might open to the world's culture. All assertions that our ambition goes beyond this are untrue, and simply invented for the purpose of rousing distrust between the United States and a country that has for generations been the friend of the Stars and Stripes, and that has never gone to war with you as England has done.

I have read in your papers statements to the effect that probably the next thing Germany would do after the close of the present war would be to invade the United States or take Brazil. Why not say the same of England? She has always had a navy twice the size of that of any other nation; she is now creating a big army; she has always been aggressive; she has conquered half the world; she has shown utter disregard of treaties; she has coaling stations all along the American coast, which form a fighting basis from Halifax down to the Falklands and from Chile up to British Columbia; she controls the entrance to the Panama Canal; she is even now dictating to Uncle Sam her own rights and laws in regard to contraband, seizing American petroleum, seizing American ships flying the Stars and Stripes, harassing American citizens, cutting cables, using wireless stations as she pleases, maiming the trade of America, locking up the Mediterranean, the North Sea, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf.

Why not consider navyism under the same light that we do militarism? I ask, who is bulldozing the rest of the world, including America, at this present moment? England wants to rule the seas. There lies her power; thence comes her commerce and therefore her riches. Whenever a nation

that is but human—as I think the English are—poses as being on a higher level than any other nation, doing everything for the benefit of the under-dog, because of altruism and a recognition of the sacredness of her given word, disclaiming emphatically any self-interest, while at the same time advertising through her writers the loftiness of her intentions, I cannot help feeling suspicious, and everybody else should, it seems to me, feel the same way.

Americans have been hearing a great deal about the English angel without wings standing with a sword drawn for the protection of liberty, freedom, and humanity and just causes, using as watchwords the fight against militarism, the principle that might is right, the infringement of the Monroe Doctrine, and so on. She has sent a host of English authors of a very special type to defend her case. I read articles by G. K. Chesterton, Hall Caine, H. G. Wells, Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, and other writers of fiction. They consider the American people a sentimental people, preferring humane stories to the cold truth, fiction to facts, and unused to doing their own thinking. Well, fiction is what these men are writing; that is their business, and the gentleman who detailed the English case in the issue of *The Saturday Evening Post* of October 17th, Mr. Arnold Bennett, is an artist of no common attainments.

But I shall make free to dig somewhat deeper into what I see to be the reason for the English attitude. England has created a large shipping trade and acquired enormous possessions oversea, and she felt secure in her supremacy. She was uneasy only on account of the United States, which—until Germany loomed up on the horizon as a big Power—she tried to treat as she was treating Germany before the war. But now she feels that her absolute sway is in danger. Even in her own domain she does a very large share only by foreign help. Most of the big bankers, from Rothschild down, are of German descent; the whole English credit would have broken down if the English authorities had not within four hours forced Baron Schroeder to become a British citizen; the diamond and gold business is in the hands of Anglicized Germans; theirs is a large share in the produce business. The English cannot do without German clerks.

A Commercial Quarrel

I remember a speech by the chairman of the London Chamber of Commerce, Lord Southwark, not longer ago than last June, in which he said: "You Germans are getting ahead of us because you are working 16 per cent longer than we and because you do not consider Saturday a holiday." That state of things was not felt much so long as it was going on within British confines and for the interest of Great Britain alone—that is, until about 1880; but then the German nation commenced to assert itself. Germans learn all the languages, whereas the English very seldom do. If an Englishman wants a stenographer to write Portuguese letters to Brazil he

must take a German clerk. German dominion in trade all over the world has been established through the fact that the German talks to the people in their own language, respects their national feeling, finds out their national wants, and delivers to them exactly what they wish to get. He never says, "We can not do this" or "You have to take our standard," but carefully carries out their orders according to the best scientific methods, and therefore at the best price. The German iron industry has, because of its improved methods, obtained a great part of England's trade. German machinery, except in the textile business, is more efficient than English machinery. The field of electricity has been entirely abandoned by England to America and Germany. Dyestuffs are now even shipped by way of America and Canada back to England. German proprietary medicines have conquered the world market and the German competition is felt everywhere.

Then, too, there is the enormous increase of German shipping, in spite of the fact that practically all the English companies doing passenger service are half broke. While the International Mercantile Marine Company has suspended payment and the big liners of the Cunard Line can live only by subsidies, Germany has been building up a most magnificent merchant marine, with ships that exceed in comfort and size anything launched from England's shipyards. Even in the tramp-steamer business, the backbone of English shipping, the Germans have made big inroads. So while the trade of Great Britain and Ireland since 1870 has risen from two billion dollars to five and a half billions, that of Germany has risen from one billion to five billions—in other words, while Germany's trade is now five times what it was in 1870, English trade is only two and a half times its former amount. For a commercial nation such as England, this condition is very serious. It goes to the very core of the nation's existence. Therefore, Great Britain faced the alternative of getting better habits of work, improved machinery, better education, better knowledge of foreign languages—that is, being more industrious, less luxurious, and more painstaking—or of fighting. But England was not accustomed to doing her own fighting, save with her fleet. The other fellows, whose welfare she has so much at heart, could fight for her, so it was not very difficult for her to make her choice.

This is the real explanation of the present war. The correctness of this view is proved by the constant invitations sent out from England to America to help her get away with the German trade, an idea that is justly repulsive to the American mind. So it was not Germany's militarism that England feared, but German trade and commerce, which she could not destroy because of the military and naval forces behind them.

Germany is now attacked by seven nations. She is fighting morally for her freedom and for her existence. She has no special grudge against anybody. She is modest in her aspirations, and merely wants to maintain her place under the sun. She wants equal opportunity, open-door politics,

and open commerce throughout the world. Nor is she either Hunnic or barbarian, as Americans will have learned from the twenty-five million German or German-American people who live in their midst. She is out for conquest on a peaceful line, the line where the higher culture wins, where the more industrious and laborious are sure to prevail. This is to the interest of all the world. Germany has to her record forty-four years of peace, and she has never coveted her neighbors' possessions. So, as far as the moral issue goes, she has much the best showing to make of all the nations now at war, and it is within eternal justice that she should and will prevail.

ENGLAND'S SHARE OF GUILT IN THE WAR

A Review of the Official Publications, Especially of the English Documents, Vouched for by Dr. Dernburg

[The following is presented as a complete defense of the German position in the present war, and is based upon examination of the German and English "White Papers." It was prepared in Germany and forwarded to Dr. Bernhard Dernburg, who had it translated for the New York "Times." Dr. Dernburg gives this statement his full approval and accepts complete responsibility for it.]

Two of the five great European Powers that are at present engaged in war, Austria-Hungary and Russia, whose differences for years have been constantly increasing in sharpness, and after the tragedy in Sarajevo became impossible to be bridged by diplomacy, conjured up the frightful struggle.

With these two, two other Powers are so closely united by alliances that their participation in the war also was unavoidable; they are Germany and France.

There are two other great European Powers whose relations to the two aforesaid groups before the war were very much alike in the essential points. Just as Italy was politically tied by alliance to the Central Powers, so England was with the Franco-Russian Alliance. Hence it was uncertain how these countries, each geographically removed from the main body of the Continent, would act in a war, and it seemed quite possible that both would decide to remain neutral.

As a matter of fact, the Italian Government came to the view that such a stand would be for the best interests of its country.

This decision might have made it considerably more easy for England also to maintain her neutrality, which from political, economical, and ethical reasons would have been advantageous and natural for the Island Empire. To the surprise and indignation of all those Germans who for years had been working toward an adjustment of the conflicting interests of both countries—among these ought to be mentioned, above all, the Kaiser and the Imperial Chancellor—the Liberal British Ministry immediately declared war on Germany, and did not confine itself to a naval war, but, in keeping with agreements reached years ago between the English and the French General Staffs, as is now admitted, equipped an expeditionary army, thus considerably strengthening the French forces.

The question arises, "What reasons led British politics to this monstrous step?"

Much has been written during the last weeks from the German side, criticizing most sharply and with great justification the motive of the London Cabinet. In the following discussion we will confine ourselves to an

impartial review of the documents published by the English Government itself in its own defense.

The essential part of this justification is contained in the "Correspondence Concerning the European Crisis" placed before the British Parliament shortly after the start of the war, which is known as the British "White Paper." In amplification are to be considered the "White Book" placed by the German Government before the Reichstag, and the "Orange Book" published by Russia.

I.

THE RUSSIAN MOBILIZATION

In a public speech, delivered September 19, the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Lloyd-George, according to the report of the *Westminster Gazette*, which may be considered as his organ, characterized the quarrel between Germany and Russia in the picturesque manner which this statesman prefers, as follows:

GERMANY—I insist that you stand aside with crossed arms while Austria strangles your little brother Servia.

RUSSIA—Just you touch this little fellow and I will tear your ramshackle Empire limb from limb.

We will not waste words in considering the flippant form here used in a discussion of an unspeakably bloody and world-historic conflict. But this expression in very pregnant form makes Russia appear in the light in which the London powers-that-be desire to show the Empire of the Czar to the British people, viz., in the rôle of the noble-hearted protector of persecuted innocence, while Germany, supporting and egging on Austria-Hungary, is shown as morally responsible for the war.

Cites English Documents

This, also, is the chain of thought in the speech of the British Prime Minister in the House of Commons on August 4. Translations of this speech have been spread by the British Government in neutral countries in hundreds of thousands of copies under the title, "The Power Responsible for War Is Germany."

Now, we claim that the British "White Paper" itself furnishes irrefutable proof that not Germany, which up to the last moment offered the hand of mediation, but Russia is responsible for the war, and that the Foreign Office at London was fully cognizant of this fact.

Furthermore, the "White Paper" shows that England's claim that she entered this war solely as a protector of the small nations is a fable.

The documents reproduced in the "White Paper" do not begin until July 20, and only a few introductory dispatches before the 24th are given. The first of the very important reports of the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, Sir George Buchanan, to Secretary of State Grey is dated

on that day; on the same day the note addressed by Austria-Hungary to the Servian Government had been brought to the knowledge of the European Cabinets, and the British Ambassador conferred with the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Sasanow, over this matter. The French Minister also took part in this conference. When the latter and M. Sasanow in the most insistent way tried to prove to Buchanan that England, together with Russia and France, must assume a threatening attitude toward Austria-Hungary and Germany, the British Ambassador replied:

I said that I would telegraph a full report to you of what their Excellencies had just said to me. I could not, of course, speak in the name of his Majesty's Government, but personally I saw no reason to expect any declaration of solidarity from his Majesty's Government that would entail an unconditional engagement on their part to support Russia and France by force of arms. Direct British interests in Servia were nil, and a war on behalf of that country would never be sanctioned by British public opinion.—*British "White Paper" No. 6.*

The British Ambassador thereupon asked the question whether Russia was thinking of eventually declaring war on Austria. The following was the answer:

M. Sasanow said that he himself thought that Russian mobilization would at any rate have to be carried out; but a council of Ministers was being held this afternoon to consider the whole question.

The dispatch continues:

French Ambassador and M. Sasanow both continue to press me for a declaration of complete solidarity of his Majesty's Government with French and Russian Governments. . . .—*British "White Paper" No. 6.*

This shows plainly that the Russian mobilization must have been planned even before July 24, for otherwise M. Sasanow could not have spoken of the necessity of carrying it through.

It is furthermore very remarkable that the Russian Minister on this early day spoke of the mobilization in general and not of the partial mobilization against Austria-Hungary.

Finally, we find that the British Government was fully informed at the very latest on July 24—it may have had before it previous documents, but they are not contained in the "White Paper"—concerning Russian mobilization, and thereby the development of Russian and French politics that had to be anticipated.

Russian Aggression

Had there been any doubts concerning these matters on the part of the British Government, the continual urging of Russian and French diplomatists must have made things plain. Russia's aggressive policy, and not the Austrian declaration of war on Servia, which did not come until five days later, led to the European War. Servia meant so little to England, although England traditionally poses as a protector of small nations, that the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg was able to describe England's

interest in the kingdom on the Save as *nil*. Only later, after the beginning of the war, England warmed up to Servia, and in the aforementioned speech Mr. Lloyd-George found the most hearty tones in speaking of the heroic fight of this "little nation," although he was obliged to admit simultaneously that its history is not untainted.

On the day following that conversation, on July 25, the British Ambassador had another talk with M. Sasanow, during the course of which he felt obliged to express to the Russian Government a serious warning concerning its mobilization.

On my expressing the earnest hope that Russia would not precipitate war by mobilizing until you had had time to use your influence in favor of peace, his Excellency assured me that Russia had no aggressive intentions and she would take no action until it was forced on her. Austria's action was in reality directed against Russia. She aimed at overthrowing the present *status quo* in the Balkans and establishing her own hegemony there. He did not believe that Germany really wanted war, but her attitude was decided by ours. If we took our stand firmly with France and Russia there would be no war. If we failed them now, rivers of blood would flow and we would in the end be dragged into war.

I said all I could to impress prudence on the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and warned him that if Russia mobilized Germany would not be content with mere mobilization or give Russia time to carry out hers, but would probably declare war at once! His Excellency replied that Russia could not allow Austria to crush Servia and become the predominant Power in the Balkans, and, if she feels secure of the support of France, she will face all the risks of war. He assured me once more that he did not wish to precipitate a conflict, but that unless Germany could restrain Austria I could regard the situation as desperate.—*British "White Paper" No. 17.*

A more convincing contradiction of the claim that Germany fell upon unexpectant Russia can hardly be imagined. Sasanow's conversation with the British Ambassador shows that Russia had decided from the beginning to bring about the war, unless Austria would subject itself to Russia's dictation.

Now, Russia was not alone concerned about Servia, but from its viewpoint Austria-Hungary must not maintain the preponderant position in the Balkans.

Buchanan Warned Russia

Sure of French help, Russia was determined to work against this. The reports of the British representative do not suggest with a word that Germany was responsible for the war; on the contrary, Sir Buchanan again, on his own account, warned the Russian Government to keep aloof from military measures, in his conversation with M. Sasanow on July 27, although the "White Paper" does not show that he had received any instructions by Sir Edward Grey.

His Excellency must not, if our efforts were to be successful, do anything to precipitate a conflict. In these circumstances I trusted that the Russian Government would defer the mobilization ukase for as long as possible, and that troops would not be allowed to cross the frontier even when it was issued.—*British "White Paper" No. 44.*

Just as its own Ambassador in St. Petersburg pointed out to the British Government the dangers of Russian mobilization, England did not lack

German warnings. On July 28 the British Ambassador in Berlin, Sir E. Goschen, reported as follows by wire concerning a conversation with the Imperial Chancellor:

. . . but if the news were true which he had just read in the papers, that Russia had mobilized fourteen army corps in the south, he thought the situation was very serious, and he himself would be in a very difficult position, as in these circumstances it would be out of his power to continue to preach moderation at Vienna. He added that Austria, who as yet was only partially mobilizing, would have to take similar measures, and if war were to result Russia would be entirely responsible. —*British "White Paper" No. 71.*

In a telegram of Mr. Goschen's of July 30, reporting a conversation with the Secretary of State Von Jagow, it is stated:

He begged me to impress on you the difficulty of Germany's position in view of Russian mobilization and military measures which he hears are being taken in France.—*British "White Paper" No. 98.*

The British Government has added a few further publications to its "White Paper." Among these is a report of the hitherto British Ambassador in Vienna, Sir Maurice de Bunsen. The document is dated September 1; that is, a full month after the outbreak of the war. The tendency of this publication is not only to unburden Russia and England from all blame and to put it upon German and Austro-Hungarian politics, but it attempts to make Germany responsible for the war to a greater extent than Austria-Hungary, in trying to sow dissension between the two allies.

Bunsen's Misrepresentation

Ambassador de Bunsen represents matters as if Germany, through its ultimatum to Russia on July 31, had roughly interrupted negotiations promising success then going on between Vienna and St. Petersburg. In this report it is stated:

(Retranslated)—M. Schebeko [the Russian Ambassador at Vienna] on July 28 attempted to induce the Austrian Government to authorize Count Scapary to continue negotiations which he had been carrying on with M. Sasanow, and which appeared very promising. Count Berchtold on this day declined, but two days later, July 30, although Russia then had already started partial mobilization against Austria, he received M. Schebeko again in the most courteous manner and gave his consent to continuation of the *pourparleurs*. . . . On August 1, M. Schebeko informed me that Austria was ready to submit to mediation those parts of its note to Servia which appeared to be irreconcilable to the independence of Servia. . . . Unfortunately these *pourparleurs* in St. Petersburg and Vienna were suddenly broken off by the quarrel being removed to the more dangerous territory of a direct conflict between Germany and Russia. Germany, on July 31, stepped between the two with its double ultimatum addressed to St. Petersburg and Paris. . . . A delay of a few days in all probability would have spared Europe one of the greatest wars in history.

On the other hand, be it remembered that the fact that any negotiations between Austria and Russia were carried on up to the last hour was solely the result of the uninterrupted German efforts to maintain peace, which fact Sir Maurice de Bunsen very wisely buries in silence. These negotiations, by the way, hardly were as promising of success as is made to appear.

The Austrian version of it is found in the Vienna *Fremdenblatt* of September 25, 1914. There the most important spots of Bunsen's report, that Austria-Hungary had been ready to moderate several points of its note to Servia, are mentioned as follows:

As we are told by a well-informed source, these assertions do not at all correspond to the facts; furthermore, from the very nature of the steps undertaken by the dual Monarchy in Belgrade, this would have been entirely inconceivable.

A glance at the date shows that the Bunsen report is misleading, for he himself tells that Count Berchtold, on July 30, had expressed his consent to a continuation of the exchange of thought in St. Petersburg; the latter, therefore, could not begin before the 31st, while in the night from July 30 to 31, the mobilization of the entire Russian Army against Germany was ordered in St. Petersburg, finally making impossible the continuation of the last German attempt at mediation in Vienna.

The truth is, in spite of Russian and English twistings, that without the interval caused by Germany's efforts in Vienna, which interval England allowed to pass unused in St. Petersburg, the war would have broken out a few days sooner.

Let us consider how the fact of the Russian mobilization, the dimensions and tendency of which were brought to the knowledge of the London Cabinet at the very latest on July 24, must affect Germany.

On July 24, the Russian Government declared, in an official communiqué, it would be impossible for it to remain indifferent in an Austro-Servian conflict.

Germany's Hand Forced

This declaration was followed immediately by military measures which represented the beginning of Russian mobilization long planned. But even on July 27 the Russian Minister of War, Suchomlinof, assured the German Military Attaché upon word of honor (Annex 11 of the German "White Paper") that no order for mobilization had been given and no reservists had been drawn and no horse had been commandeered.

Although in this conversation there had been left no doubt to the Russian Minister of War concerning the fact that measures of mobilization against Austria must be considered by Germany also as very threatening toward itself, during the next days news of the Russian mobilization arrived in quick succession.

On the 29th, mobilization of Southern and Southwestern Russia was ordered, which was extended on the 30th to twenty-three provinces.

On the night of the 30th to the 31st, while the efforts of the Kaiser to maintain peace were continuing and were receiving friendly attention in Vienna, in St. Petersburg the mobilization of the entire Russian Army was ordered. Even as late as 2 P.M. on the 31st, however (German "White Paper," page 18, of New York *Times* reprint), the Czar telegraphed the Kaiser that the military measures now being taken were meant for defensive

purposes against Austria's preparations, and he gave his pledge as far away from desiring war.

In the face of such evident duplicity of Russian politics, a further delay such as was desired by Sir Maurice de Bunsen would have been for every German statesman a crime against the security of his own country.

On the other hand, upon what German measures did the Russian Government base its order for mobilization? The British "White Paper" proves how frivolously steps leading to the most serious results were ordered in St. Petersburg. On July 30, Sir George Buchanan telegraphed:

M. Sasanow told us that absolute proof was in possession of the Russian Government that Germany was making military and naval preparations against Russia, more particularly in the direction of the Gulf of Finland.—*British "White Paper" No. 97.*

Proofs Lacking

On the other hand, Buchanan's telegram of July 31 (British "White Paper" No. 113) states:

Russia has also reason to believe that Germany is making active military preparations, and she cannot afford to let her get a start.—*British "White Paper" No. 113.*

So, from one day to the next the "absolute proof" changed to a reason for the assumption. In reality, both were assertions that lack all proof.

The finishing part of a telegram sent by the British Ambassador in Berlin to Sir Edward Grey on July 31 deserves special mention:

He [the German Secretary of State] again assured me that both the Emperor William, at the request of the Emperor of Russia and the German Foreign Office, had even up till last night been urging Austria to show willingness to continue discussion—and telephonic communications from Vienna had been of a promising nature—but Russia's mobilization had spoiled everything.—*British "White Paper" No. 121.*

Therefore, the German Chancellor, in his memorandum placed before the Reichstag, stated with full justification:

The Russian Government has smashed the laborious attempts at mediation on the part of the European State Chancelleries, on the eve of success, by the mobilization, endangering the safety of the Empire. The measures for a mobilization, about whose seriousness the Russian Government was fully acquainted from the beginning, in connection with their constant denial, show clearly that Russia wanted war.

To this is to be added that the English Government also was made fully cognizant of the intentions of the Russian mobilization, by a witness that could not be suspected, namely, its own representative in St. Petersburg, and therefore must bear full responsibility.

II.

GREY'S OMISSIONS AND ERRORS

We have seen from the "Blue Book" that the Secretary of State in London was informed at the very latest on July 24, by his Ambassador in St. Petersburg, of the plan of the Russian mobilization, and consequently of the tremendous seriousness of the European situation. Yet eight to

nine days had to elapse before the beginning of the war. Let us see whether Sir Edward Grey used this time to preserve peace, according to his own documents.

From this testimony it appears that even at the beginning of the last and decisive part of the European crisis, which began on June 28, 1914, with the assassination of the Austrian heir to the throne, Sir Edward Grey refrained from considering a direct participation of his country in the possible world-war. At least, this must be the impression gained from his remarks to the representatives of the two Powers with whom England is to-day at war. Thus, he said to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, Count Mensdorff, on July 23:

The possible consequences of the present situation were terrible. If as many as four great Powers of Europe—let us say Austria, France, Russia, and Germany—were engaged in war, it seemed to me that it must involve the expenditure of so vast a sum of money and such an interference with trade that a war would be accompanied or followed by a complete collapse of European credit and industry.—*British "White Paper" No. 3.*

Here Grey speaks only of four of the big Powers at most that may go to war, without even hinting at the fifth, namely, England. On July 24, he had another conversation with the Austrian Ambassador, the theme of which was the note—meanwhile presented to Serbia. It caused apprehensions on his part, but he declared again:

The merits of the dispute between Austria and Serbia were not the concern of his Majesty's Government.

I [Grey] ended by saying that doubtless we should enter into an exchange of views with other Powers, and that I must await their views as to what could be done to mitigate the difficulties of the situation.—*British "White Paper" No. 5.*

We are already striking the fateful peculiarity of Grey's policy to hesitate where prompt action, or at least a clear and open conduct would have been his duty. This weakness of his nature has been used with great art by French and Russian diplomacy. This is illustrated by the conversation of July 24 between him and the French Ambassador, Cambon, in London:

M. Cambon said that, if there was a chance of mediation by the four Powers he had no doubt that his Government would be glad to join in it; but he pointed out that we could not say anything in St. Petersburg till Russia had expressed some opinion or taken some action. But, when two days were over, Austria would march into Serbia, for the Servians could not possibly accept the Austrian demand. Russia would be compelled by her public opinion to take action as soon as Austria attacked Serbia, and, therefore, once the Austrians had attacked Serbia it would be too late for any mediation.—*British "White Paper" No. 10.*

The Situation on July 24

Thus: England must not give any advice to Russia before it knows Russia's intent and even its measures. But inasmuch as Austria will have proceeded against Serbia by that time, Russia must make war, and the conclusion is that even on July 24 the catastrophe is considered unavoidable. Grey shows himself more and more hypnotized by the fatalistic view that

it is too late. Hence he reports also on July 24 a conversation of the German Ambassador, Prince Lichnowsky:

I reminded the German Ambassador that some days ago he had expressed a personal hope that, if need arose, I would endeavor to exercise moderating influence at St. Petersburg, but now I said that, in view of the extraordinarily stiff character of the Austrian note, the shortness of the time allowed, and the wide scope of the demands upon Serbia, I felt quite helpless as far as Russia was concerned, and I did not believe any Power could exercise influence alone.—*British "White Paper" No. 11.*

From a conversation of Grey with Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador, on July 25:

Alone, we could do nothing. The French Government were traveling [this refers to the visit at St. Petersburg by Messrs. Poincaré and Viviani] at the moment, and I had had no time to consult them, and could not, therefore, be sure of their views.—*British "White Paper" No. 25.*

If Sir Edward Grey sincerely desired the maintenance of peace, he must have had to use his entire influence at St. Petersburg to bring about the stopping of the threatening military measures taken by Russia, whereas he was waiting for the opinion of the French Government. He was bound to do this, so much the more in view of the fact that he demanded from Germany that it should exert its influence with Austria.

That this request of Grey's was complied with by Germany in so far as it was in any way in accord with the alliance with Austria-Hungary, and that in Vienna every effort was made to conciliate matters, is shown by the assurance of the Chancellor. He declares:

In spite of this [the Austro-Hungarian Government having remarked with full appreciation of our action that it had come too late, we continued our mediatory efforts to the utmost and advised Vienna to make any possible compromise consistent with the dignity of the Monarchy.—*German "White Paper," page 17, of New York "Times" reprint.*

Grey well knew that Germany was doing all it could to mediate in Vienna. He expressed his recognition and his joy over it on July 28 ("Blue Book," page 67):

It is very satisfactory to hear from the German Ambassador here that the German Government have taken action at Vienna in the sense of the conversation recorded in my telegram of yesterday to you.—*British "White Paper" No. 67.**

"No diplomatic pressure whatever was exerted [by Germany] on Vienna, which, under the protection of Berlin, was permitted to do with Serbia as she liked."

Grey's own words contradict this assertion.

Neither has Grey been left in the dark by the German side concerning the difficulties, which by the Russian mobilization made every attempt to

* Recently a book entitled "Why We Make War," in defence of Great Britain, appeared at Oxford, as the authors of which "Members of the Faculty for Modern History in Oxford" are mentioned. This work undertakes, on the ground of the official publications, to whitewash Grey's policy, and, of course, incidentally the Russian policy. Altogether this publication, parading in the gown of science, is contradicted by our own presentation of the facts; it may be mentioned also that this work contains in part positive untruths. Thus it states on page 70 (retranslation):

mediate in Vienna abortive. Even on July 31, the British Ambassador in Berlin telegraphed:

The Chancellor informs me that his efforts to preach peace and moderation at Vienna have been seriously handicapped by the Russian mobilization against Austria. He has done everything possible to obtain his object at Vienna, perhaps even rather more than was altogether palatable at the Ballplatz.—*British "White Paper" No. 108.*

England and Russia

How, on the other hand, about Grey's action with Russia? From the very beginning one should have had a right to expect that, as Germany acted in Vienna, thus France, if it was active in Grey's spirit, would be working in St. Petersburg for peace. Of this no trace whatsoever can be found. The French Government thus far had not published any series of documents concerning its activity during the crisis, and neither in the Russian "Orange Book" nor in the English "Blue Book" is anything mentioned of the mediating activity on the part of France.

On the contrary, the latter Power, wherever she puts in an appearance—as, for instance, in the conversation of the English Ambassador in St. Petersburg with his French colleague and M. Sasanow, as mentioned above—appears as fully identical with Russia. It is also stated on July 24:

The French Ambassador gave me to understand that France would fulfill all the obligations entailed by her alliance with Russia if necessity arose, besides supporting Russia strongly in all diplomatic negotiations. . . . It seems to me from the language held by the French Ambassador that even if we decline to join them, France and Russia are determined to make a strong stand.—*British "White Paper" No. 6.*

One should think that Grey, who in view of this could not possibly expect an influence for peace being brought to bear by France, but only a strengthening of the Russian desire for aggression, now would have acted in the most energetic manner in St. Petersburg for the maintenance of peace.

In reality, however, during the days that still remained, aside from a weak, and in St. Petersburg absolutely ineffective, advice to postpone mobilization, he did nothing whatsoever, and later placed himself in a manner constantly more recognizable on the side of Russia.

The claim that the time limit given by the Austrian note to Servia was the cause of the war, that Grey's mediation had only miscarried owing to the haste of Germany, is disproved by the British documents themselves. De Bunsen, on July 26, telegraphed to Grey from Vienna:

Russian Ambassador just returned from leave, thinks that Austro-Hungarian Government are determined on war, and that it is impossible for Russia to remain indifferent. He does not propose to press for more time in the sense of your telegram of the 25th inst.—*British "White Paper" No. 40.*

Therefore Russia has paid little attention to the very shy and timid efforts to maintain peace by the British Secretary of State, even where these were concerned in the attempt to change the position taken by Austria.

Another proof: Sasanow on July 27 sent a telegram to the Russian Ambassador in London which the latter transmitted to Grey, and which

concerns itself with the much-mentioned proposition of the latter to have the conflict investigated by a conference of the four great Powers not immediately concerned.

Russian Sincerity Questioned

The conference plan was declined without much hesitation and openly by Germany, because it was compelled to see therein an attempt to place Austria before a European court of arbitration, and because it knew the serious determination of its ally in this matter. But did Russia really want the conference? Minister Sasanow declares:

I replied to the [British] Ambassador that I have begun conversations with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador under conditions which I hope may be favorable. I have not, however, received as yet any reply to the proposal made by me for revising the note between the two Cabinets.—*British "White Paper" No. 53.*

Here it is shown plainly how little the conference plan was after the heart of the Russians. Had they accepted it it would have had to be done immediately. As soon as the situation had grown very much more serious by the failure of the negotiations with Austria-Hungary there would have been no more time for this.*

A telegram of the English Ambassador in St. Petersburg, dated July 27 (British "White Paper" No. 55), shows how this conference was expected to be conducted in St. Petersburg:

His Excellency [Sasanow] said he was perfectly ready to stand aside if the Powers accepted the proposal for a conference, but he trusted that you would keep in touch with the Russian Ambassador in the event of its taking place.—*British "White Paper" No. 55.*

Russian shrewdness evidently expected to control the conference by keeping in touch with Grey, who, of course, would have been the Chairman.

* In the aforementioned book of the Oxford historians there is stated on page 69 (retranslation):

This mediation [namely, Grey's mediation proposition] had already been accepted by Russia on July 25.

We have shown in the foregoing that the Russian Government did in no manner subscribe to the conference plan in binding terms. As an additional proof, a part of Buchanan's dispatch of the 25th may be mentioned:

He [Sasanow] would like to see the question placed on an international footing. . . . If Serbia should appeal to the Powers, Russia would be quite ready to stand aside and leave the question in the hands of England, France, Germany, and Italy. It would be possible in his opinion that Serbia might propose to submit the question to arbitration.—*British "White Paper" No. 17.*

Hence, not if England, but only if Serbia would propose arbitration by the Powers, Mr. Sasanow was willing! The most amusing part of this is that the Russian Minister himself considers such a proposition on the part of Serbia merely as "possible"; evidently it would have appeared as a great condescension on the part of the Government at Belgrade if it, standing on the same basis as Austria-Hungary, would appear before a European tribunal! For us there is no additional proof necessary that a mediation conference, which for Austria was not acceptable even when proposed by England, would be unthinkable if the move for such came from Serbia. In expressing such an idea, Mr. Sasanow proved that it was his intention to bring war about.

The dispatches of his own Ambassadors lying before him should have enabled the Secretary of State to see the perfidy of the Russian policy. Buchanan wrote on the 28th from St. Petersburg:

. . . and asked him whether he would be satisfied with the assurance which the Austrian Ambassador had, I understood, been instructed to give in respect to Servia's integrity and independence. . . . In reply, his Excellency stated that if Servia were attacked Russia would not be satisfied with any engagement which Austria might take on these two points. . . . —*British "White Paper" No. 72.*

Entirely in contrast herewith is one report of the British representative in Vienna, dated August 1, and speaking of a conversation with the Russian Ambassador there:

Russia would, according to the Russian Ambassador, be satisfied even now with assurance respecting Servian integrity and independence. He said that Russia had no intention to attack Austria.—*British "White Paper" No. 141.*

What, then, may one ask, was the opinion which Sir Edward Grey had formed concerning Russia's real intentions? He learns from Russian sources and notes faithfully that Russia will accept Austrian guarantees for independence of Servia, and also that it will not accept such guarantees. It is the same duplicity which Russia, when its own mobilization was concerned, showed toward Germany. Did Sir Edward not notice this duplicity, or did he not wish to notice it? If the documents of the English Government have not been selected with the purpose to confuse, then in London the decision to take part in the war does not seem to have been a certainty at the beginning. We have seen that Ambassador Buchanan, in St. Petersburg, on July 24, gave the Russian Minister to understand that England was not of a mind to go to war on account of Servia. This position, taken by the Ambassador, was approved by Sir Edward Grey on the following day in the following words:

I entirely approve what you said . . . and I cannot promise more on behalf of the Government.—*British "White Paper" No. 24.*

Germany Not To Be Intimidated

Based upon these instructions, Sir George Buchanan, even on July 27, stated to M. Sasanow, who continued to urge England to join Russia and France unconditionally:

I added that you [Grey] could not promise to do anything more, and that his Excellency was mistaken if he believed that the cause of peace could be promoted by our telling the German Government that they would have to deal with us as well as with Russia and France if she supported Austria by force of arms. Their [the German] attitude would merely be stiffened by such a menace.—*British "White Paper" No. 44.*

But on this same 27th day of July, Grey, submitting to the intrigues of Russian and French diplomacy, had committed one very fateful step (telegram to Buchanan, July 27):

I have been told by the Russian Ambassador that in German and Austrian circles impression prevails that in any event we would stand aside. His Excellency

deplored the effect that such an impression must produce. This impression ought, as I have pointed out, to be dispelled by the orders we have given to the first fleet which is concentrated, as it happens, at Portland not to disperse for manœuvre leave. But I explained to the Russian Ambassador that my reference to it must not be taken to mean that anything more than diplomatic action was promised.—*British "White Paper" No. 47.*

For Russia this order to the fleet meant very much more than a diplomatic action. Sasanow saw that the wind in London was turning in his favor and he made use of it. Among themselves the Russian diplomatists seem to have for a long time been clear and open in their discussion of their real object. You find among the documents of the Russian "Orange Book" the following telegram of Sasanow of July 25 to the Russian Ambassador in London:

In case of a new aggravation of the situation, possibly provoking on the part of the great Powers united action [*des actions conformes*], we count that England will not delay placing herself clearly on the side of Russia and France, with the view to maintaining the equilibrium of Europe, in favor of which she has constantly intervened in the past, and which would without doubt be compromised in the case of the triumph of Austria.—*Russian "Orange Paper" No. 17.*

There is no mention of Servia here, but Austria should not triumph. Russia's real intention, of course, was not placed so nakedly before the British Secretary of State, hence to him the appearance was maintained that the little State of the Save was the only consideration, although the Russian army was already being mobilized with all energy.

On the 28th he wires to the Russian Ambassador, Count Benckendorff, to London to inform the British Government:

It seems to me that England is in a better position than any other Power to make another attempt at Berlin to induce the German Government to take the necessary action. There is no doubt that the key of the situation is to be found at Berlin.—*British "White Paper" No. 54.*

The opinion subtly suggested upon him by Paris and St. Petersburg diplomacy, namely, that he should not use any pressure upon Russia, but upon Germany, now takes hold of Grey more and more. On July 29 he writes to the German Ambassador as follows:

In fact, mediation was ready to come into operation by any method that Germany thought possible if only Germany would "press the button in the interests of peace."—*British "White Paper" No. 84.*

St. Petersburg, now assured of the support of Grey, becomes more and more outspoken for war. On the 28th, Grey again expressed one of his soft-hearted propositions for peace. Mr. Sasanow hardly made the effort to hide his contempt. Buchanan telegraphs on the 29th as follows:

The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that proposal referred to in your telegram of the 28th inst. was one of secondary importance. Under altered circumstances of situation he did not attach weight to it. . . . Minister for Foreign Affairs had given me to understand that Russia would not precipitate war by crossing frontier immediately, and a week or more would in any case elapse before mobilization was completed. In order to find an issue out of a dangerous situation, it was necessary that we should in the meanwhile all work together.—*British "White Paper" No. 78.*

Naïveté or Cynicism?

Here it really becomes impossible to judge where the naïveté of the British Secretary of State ends and cynicism begins, for Sasanow could not have told to him more plainly than in these lines that all Russia's ostensible readiness for peace served no other purpose than to win time to complete the strategical location of the Russian troops.

This point is emphasized by one document coming from a writer presumably unbiased, but presumably distrustful of Germany, wherein the confirmation is found that England and Russia had come to a full agreement during these days.

On July 30, Belgian Chargé d'Affaires de l'Escaille in St. Petersburg reported to the Belgian Government upon the European crisis. Owing to the fast-developing events of a warlike nature, this letter did not reach its address by mail, and it was published later on. The Belgian diplomatist writes:

It is undeniable that Germany tried hard here [that is, in St. Petersburg], and in Vienna to find any means whatsoever in order to forestall a general conflict. . . .

And after M. de l'Escaille has told that Russia—what the Czar and his War Minister with their highest assurances toward Germany had denied—was mobilizing its own army, he continues:

To-day at St. Petersburg one is absolutely convinced—yes, they have even received assurances in that direction—that England and France will stay by them. This assistance is of decisive importance and has contributed much to the victory of the [Russian] war party.

This settles Grey's pretended "attempts at mediation." The truth is that British politics, decided to prevent a diplomatic success of Germany and Austria, now worked openly toward the Russian aim. "The exertion of pressure upon Berlin" included already a certain threat, mingled with good advice.

On July 23, Grey had only spoken of four possible Powers in war; hence when on the German side some hope of England maintaining neutrality was indulged in, this impression rested upon Grey's own explanations. On July 29, however, after a political conversation with Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador in London, he adds an important personal bit of information. He wires concerning it to Berlin, to Goschen:

After speaking to the German Ambassador this afternoon about the European situation, I said that I wished to say to him, in a quite private and friendly way, something that was on my mind. The situation was very grave. . . . But if we failed in our efforts to keep the peace and if the issue spread so that it involved every European interest, I did not wish to be open to any reproach from him, that the friendly tone of all our conversations had misled him or his Government into supposing that we should not take action. . . . But we knew very well that if the issue did become such that we thought that British interests required us to intervene, we must intervene at once and the decision would have to be very rapid.—*British "White Paper" No. 89.*

But what is especially wrong is that Grey brought this warning, which only could have any effect if it remained an absolute, confidential secret

between the English and German Governments; also to the French Ambassador, so that the entire Entente could mischievously look on and see whether Germany really would give in to British pressure. Of course, in his manner of swaying to and fro, he did not wish either that Cambon should not accept this information to the German Ambassador as a decided taking of a position on the part of England:

I thought it necessary [speaking to M. Cambon] to say that because as he knew we were taking all precautions with regard to our fleet and I was about to warn Prince Lichnowsky not to count on our standing aside, that it would not be fair that I should let M. Cambon be misled into supposing that we had decided what to do in a contingency that I still hoped might not arise. . . . —*British "White Paper" No. 87.*

Stirring Up Trouble

On the German side, Grey's open threat, which was presented, however, with smooth and friendly sounding words, was received with quiet politeness. Goschen telegraphed on the 30th concerning a talk with State Secretary von Jagow:

His Excellency added that the telegram received from Prince Lichnowsky last night contains matter which he had heard with regret, but not exactly with surprise, and, at all events, he thoroughly appreciated the frankness and loyalty with which you had spoken.—*British "White Paper" No. 98.*

Now the work of stirring up trouble is continued unceasingly. On July 30, the British Ambassador in Paris, Sir F. Bertie, concerning a conversation with the President of the Republic, reports:

He [Poincaré] is convinced that peace between the Powers is in the hands of Great Britain. If his Majesty's Government announced that England would come to the aid of France in the event of a conflict between France and Germany . . . there would be no war, for Germany would at once modify her attitude.—*British "White Paper" No. 99.*

Did Grey really think for one moment that the German Empire would change its position immediately—in other words, would suddenly leave its ally in need—or is all this only a mass of diplomatic blandishments?

On the same day Grey steps from the personal warning which he had given to the German Ambassador to the sharpest official threat. In a telegram to the Ambassador in Berlin upon the question placed before him by the Chancellor of the Empire on the day prior (*British "White Paper" No. 85*), whether England would remain neutral if Germany would bind itself, after possible war, to claim no French territory in Europe whatever, while in lieu of the French colonies a like guarantee could not be accepted, Grey answers with thundering words:

His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain the Chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality on such terms. What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French colonies are taken and France is beaten, so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the colonies. From a material point of view such a proposal is unacceptable, for France without further territory in Europe being taken from her could be so crushed as to lose her position as a great Power and become subordinate to German policy. Alto-

gether apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the good name of this country could never recover.—*British "White Paper" No. 101.*

With this telegram, the war on Germany was practically declared, for as a price of British neutrality an open humiliation of Germany was demanded. If France—the question of French colonies is of very minor importance in this connection—must not be defeated by Germany, then England forbade the German Government to make war. It was furthermore stated that Germany was absolutely compelled to accept Russian-French dictates, and would have to leave Austria to its own resources. This would have meant Germany's retirement from the position of a great Power, even if she had backed down before such a challenge.

III.

THE AGREEMENT WITH FRANCE

Only in the light of the developments concerning England's relation to France, given at the beginning of the war, Grey's policy, swaying between indecision and precipitate action, becomes apparent.

In all the explanations which the British Government in the course of eight years had presented to the British Parliament concerning the relations to other large Powers, the assurance had been repeated that no binding agreements with the two partners of the Franco-Russian alliance had been made, above all, that no agreement with France existed. Only in his speech in the House of Commons on August 3, 1914, which meant the war with Germany, Grey gave to the representatives of the people news of certain agreements which made it a duty for Great Britain to work together with France in any European crisis.

The fateful document, which in the form of an apparently private letter to the French Ambassador, dealt with one of the most important compacts of modern history, was written toward the end of the year 1912, and is published in the British "White Paper" No. 105, Annex 1:

LONDON, FOREIGN OFFICE, November 22, 1912.

MY DEAR AMBASSADOR:

From time to time in recent years, the French and British naval and military experts have consulted together. It has always been understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not, and ought not to be regarded as, an engagement that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war.

You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other.

I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would

be prepared to take in common. If these measures involved action, the plans of the General Staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the Governments would then decide what effect should be given to them.

Yours etc.,
E. GREY.

Parliament Deceived

A few members of the English Parliament who, on August 3, dared to protest gingerly against the war, may have had reason to complain about the hiding of facts from the House of Commons. When such understandings can be made without any one having an idea of their existence, then—so far as England is concerned—the supervision of the Government, theoretically being exercised by a Parliament, becomes a fiction.

As a matter of fact, Grey does not desire to have accepted as political obligations the conversations of the French and English Army and Navy General Staffs concerning the future plans of campaign which took place from time to time in times of peace. However, the true tendency of this agreement, for such it is, gives itself away in the promise to enter immediately with France into a political and military exchange of opinions in every critical situation; it means in reality nothing less than a veiled defensive alliance which, by clever diplomatic manipulations, can be changed without any difficulty to an offensive one, for inasmuch as the English Government promises to consult and work together with France, and consequently also with its ally, Russia, in every crisis, before a serious investigation of the moments of danger, it waives all right of taking an independent position.

How would England ever have been able to enter a war against France without throwing upon itself the accusation of faithlessness against one with whose plans for war it had become acquainted through negotiations lasting through years?

Here a deviation may be permissible, which leaves for a moment the basis of documentary proof.

If one considers how this agreement of such immeasurable consequences was not only hidden from the British Parliament by the Cabinet, but how to the very edge of conscious deceit its existence was denied—in the year 1913 Premier Asquith answered a query of a member of the House of Commons that there were no unpublished agreements in existence, which, in a case of war between European Powers, would interfere with or limit free decision on the part of the British Government or Parliament as to whether or not Britain should take part in a war—then certain reports making their appearance with great persistency in June, 1914, concerning an Anglo-Russian naval agreement are seen in a different light.

Persons who were acquainted with the happenings in diplomacy then stated that the Russian Ambassador in Paris, M. Iswolski, during the visit which the King of England and Sir Edward Grey were paying to Paris, had succeeded in winning the English statesmen for the plan of such an agreement. A formal alliance, it was said, was not being demanded by

Russia immediately, for good reasons. M. Iswolski was attempting to go nearer to his goal, carefully, step by step.

It had been preliminarily agreed that negotiations should be started between the British Admiralty and the Russian Naval Attaché in London, Capt. Wolkow. As a matter of fact, Wolkow, during June went to St. Petersburg for a few days to, as was assumed, obtain instructions and then return to London.

Grey's "Twisty" Answer

These happenings aroused so much attention in England that questions were raised in Parliament concerning them. It was noted how twisty Grey's answer was. He referred to the answer of the Premier, already mentioned, stated that the situation is unchanged, and said then that no negotiations were under way concerning a naval agreement with any foreign nation. "As far as he was able to judge the matter," no such negotiations would be entered into later on.

The big Liberal newspaper, *The Manchester Guardian*, was not at all satisfied with this explanation; it assumed that certain conditional preliminary agreements might not be excluded.

This Russian plan, which was later worked out in St. Petersburg, went into oblivion on account of the rapidly following European War. In the light of the following revelation of Grey's agreement with France, the news of the naval agreement desired by Iswolski assumed another aspect.

Let us return to the Anglo-French agreement. The following remarks by the French Ambassador in London, reported by Grey, proves that, on the ground of this agreement, France, with very little trouble, would be able to make out of a diplomatic entanglement a case for the Allies' interest as far as England is concerned.

A German "Attack"

He [Cambon] anticipated that the [German] aggression would take the form of either a demand to cease her preparations or a demand that she should engage to remain neutral if there was war between Germany and Russia. Neither of these things would France admit.—*British "White Paper" No. 105.*

Therefore, even the demand addressed to France not to, jointly with Russia, attack Germany, became a German "attack," which obliged England to come to the aid!

In spite of this, even on July 27, in a conversation with Cambon, Grey gave himself the appearance as if his hands were free. He told the Frenchman:

If Germany became involved and France became involved we had not made up our minds what we should do; it was a case that we should have to consider. . . . We were free from engagements and we should have to decide what British interests required us to do.—*British "White Paper" No. 87.*

M. Cambon remarked in reply that the Secretary of State had clearly pictured the situation, but on the very following day the French Ambassador

took the liberty to remind Grey of the letter written in 1912 (British "White Paper" No. 105).

Grey did not deny the claim implied in this reminder, but even as late as July 31 he reports as follows concerning the conversation with Cambon:

Up to the present moment we did not feel, and public opinion did not feel, that any treaties or obligations of this country were involved. . . . M. Cambon repeated his question whether we would help France if Germany made an attack on her. I said I could only adhere to the answer that, as far as things had gone at present, we could not take any engagement. . . . I said that the Cabinet would certainly be summoned as soon as there was some new development; that at the present moment the only answer I could give was that we could not undertake any definite engagement.—*British "White Paper" No. 119.*

Now, if we remember that even on the day before Grey had informed the German Imperial Chancellor it would be a shame for England to remain neutral and allow France to be crushed, we here find a new proof of the unreliability of his conduct. If he has been gullible, the declaration of 1912, the dangerous character of which is increased by its apparently undefined tenor, has enmeshed him more and more. Also the military and naval circles, whose consultations with the representatives of the French Army and Navy certainly have been continued diligently since the beginning of the Servian crisis, were forcing toward a decision.

At all events it became more impossible with every hour for Germany to keep England out of the war by any offers whatsoever. This is proved by Grey's conversation of August 1 with the German Ambassador:

He asked me whether if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgian neutrality we would engage to remain neutral. I replied that I could not say that; our hands were still free, and we were considering what our attitude should be. . . . The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate conditions on which we would remain neutral. I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise. . . . —*British "White Paper" No. 123.*

Belgium Not the Cause

Hence, only if Germany would permit herself to be humiliated, war with England could be avoided. The violation of Belgium's neutrality was in no way the cause of England joining Germany's enemies, for while German troops did not enter Belgium until the night from August 3 to 4, Grey gave on August 2 the following memorandum to the French Ambassador after a session of the Cabinet in London:

I am authorized to give an assurance that if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power.—*British "White Paper" No. 148.*

As the aim of this decision, of which M. Cambon was informed verbally, was to give France an assurance that it would be placed in a position "to settle the disposition of its own Mediterranean fleet," Grey would not accept the version of Cambon that England would take part in a war with Germany. This is a case of splitting hairs in order to put the blame of starting the war on Germany, for while England promised to protect the French coast and to make it possible for the French fleet to stay in the

Mediterranean, she almost immediately proceeded to a warlike action against Germany, especially as the English Minister simultaneously refused to bind himself to maintain even this peculiar neutrality.

IV.

BELGIAN NEUTRALITY

The highest representatives of the German Empire, with emphatic seriousness, declared that it was with a heavy heart and only following the law of self-preservation that they decided to violate the neutrality of the Kingdom of Belgium, guaranteed by the great Powers in the Treaties of 1831 and 1839.

The German Secretary of State, on August 4, informed the English Government, through the embassy in London, that Germany intended to retain no Belgian territory, and added:

Please impress upon Sir E. Grey that the German Army could not be exposed to French attack across Belgium, which was planned, according to absolutely unimpeachable information. Germany had consequently to disregard Belgian neutrality, it being with her a question of life or death to prevent French advance.—*British "White Paper" No. 157.*

In answer, Grey caused the English Ambassador in Berlin to demand his passports and to tell the German Government that England would take all steps for defence of Belgian neutrality.

This, therefore, represents, in the view which very cleverly has been spread broadcast by British publicity, the real reason for the war. But in spite of the moral indignation that is apparent against Germany, the consideration for Belgium, up until very late, does not seem in any way to have been in the foreground. We find, on July 31, Grey stated to Cambon:

The preservation of the neutrality of Belgium might be, I would not say a decisive, but an important, factor in determining our attitude.—*British "White Paper" No. 119.*

Here, therefore, there was no talk about England grasping the sword on account of Belgium. Now no one will claim that the assumption that the German troops could march through Belgium would be new or unheard of. For years this possibility had been discussed in military literature.*

A Sudden Decision

It must also be assumed that the Belgian Government knew toward the end of July at the latest that the war between Germany and France was probable and the march of Germans through Belgium very possible.

* The book, which appeared at Oxford, "Why We Are at War," mentioned previously, states on page 27 (retranslation):

That such a plan [the marching through Luxemburg and Belgium] had been taken into consideration by the Germans, has been known in England generally for several years; and it has also been generally accepted that the attempt to carry out this plan would bring about the active resistance of the British armed forces; one assumed that these would be given the task of assisting the left wing of the French, which would have to resist German advance from Belgian territory.

This expression on the part of the historical Faculty is very interesting. It shows

If England had not taken part in the war against Germany, it may be assumed that it would have given Belgium the advice to permit the marching through of the German Army, somewhat in the same manner as the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg did, with a protest. In doing so the Belgian people would have been spared a great deal of misery and loss of blood. On August 3, the Belgian Government replied to an offer of military help by France as follows:

We are sincerely grateful to the French Government for offering eventual support. In the actual circumstances, however, we do not propose to appeal to the guarantee of the Powers. Belgian Government will decide later on the action which they may think necessary to take.—*British "White Paper" No. 151.*

One day later London decided to make Belgian neutrality the cause of the war against Germany before the eyes of the world. The Ambassador in Brussels received the following orders:

You should inform Belgian Government that if pressure is applied to them by Germany to induce them to depart from neutrality, his Majesty's Government expect that they will resist by any means in their power, and that his Majesty's Government will support them in offering such resistance, and that his Majesty's Government in this event are prepared to join Russia and France.—*British "White Paper" No. 155.*

Not until England thus stirred Belgium up, holding out the deceptive hope of effective French and English help, did Belgian fanaticism break loose against Germany. Without the intervention of England in Brussels the events in Belgium, one may safely assert, would have taken an entirely different course, which would have been far more favorable to Belgium.

But, of course, England had thus found a very useful reason for war against Germany. Even on the 31st of July, Grey had spoken of the violation of Belgian neutrality as not a decisive factor. On August 1, he declined to promise Prince Lichnowsky England's neutrality, even if Germany would not violate Belgium's neutrality. On August 4, however, the Belgian question was the cause that suddenly drove England to maintain the moral fabric of the world and to draw the sword.

This suddenly became the new development, which was still lacking for Grey in order to justify this war before public opinion in England.

Another English Advantage

And something else was secured by the drawing of Belgium into the war by the British Government, which had decided to make war on Germany for entirely different reasons: the thankful part of the protector of the weak and the oppressed.

As an English diplomat, when Russia was mobilizing, openly stated, the interests of his country in Serbia were nil, so for Grey even Belgium, immediately before the break with Germany, was not decisive. However, *when England had irrevocably decided to enter the war, it stepped out before the limelight of the world as the champion of—the small nations.*

that a plan of campaign between the English and French had long been considered, and that the Belgian entry into the alliance against Germany was a matter agreed upon.

GERMANY AND THE POWERS

(From "*The North American Review*," December, 1914)

When, like a stroke of lightning from a serene blue heaven, the world war broke out in Europe, Americans stood dumfounded, amazed, and horrified. All the attainments of twentieth-century civilization seemed to crumble under their very feet. All the endeavors that had been made to settle international difficulties by treaties or arbitration seemed to be absolutely futile. All the protestations that the various peoples of Europe had been making continuously for peace and good-will were discredited. It was not so much the resentment against the disturbance of trade, the stopping of exports, and inconvenience of unbalanced financial relations, the anxiety for a host of relatives and friends who had been entrapped in the warring countries, that roused this American feeling; the public on this side was deeply hurt in its ethical feeling, in its moral attitude, toward solemn obligations, in its sympathies for smaller nations. What was all that civilization that the world had been boasting of so much? What did the word "culture" mean if from one day to the next Europe could become the field of brutality, burning, and sacking? Was not the world thrown back for a century or more, and were not all the sincere endeavors to bring about a more human state of things by international treaties permanently in danger by this spectacle of treaties being disregarded and torn to shreds? What would all this mean for the United States? Had she not let herself be inveigled into a spirit of security, into an optimism without foundation, into the hope for a better and more peaceful world?

The breaking out of the war was considered here as a crime against humanity, and it cannot be wondered at that the next question was, Who was the author of that crime? Who permitted it, by act of tolerance, to be perpetrated? The answer seemed to come quickly on irrefutable evidence. The brutality of the Austrian ultimatum; the failure of Germany to repress her ally; the Russian feeling for the small boundary states; the French resentment of the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine; the English attitude toward guaranteed treaties—all seemed to be a chain of evidence that laid the blame to the door of Germany, and Germany did not defend herself because she could not—being deprived of direct communication in consequence of the cutting of cables and the stringent British rules against the printing of uncensored news.

So the judgment was quickly formed. It could only be formed on the

evidence presented, one-sided though it was. And, in the absence of facts, Americans had to rely on sentiment which strongly favored the Allies.

The greater the American nation has become the more it has built up a civilization of its own. The more intense national life has grown, the less Americans have had reason to busy themselves with the happenings in far-away countries, and as little as it can be expected that the men in the interior of Russia should know anything of American institutions and statecraft, as little can it be fairly demanded that Americans should be intimately acquainted with the intricacies of European politics.

Therefore it may not be amiss to try to sketch the state of things in Europe as it has been, the various peoples involved, their aims, ambitions, and necessities, the driving forces behind them, and the historical development that resulted in the explosion.

The immediate cause was the trouble between Austria and Servia. Servia has played the foremost part in the Balkans, as Professor Sloane in his remarkable book, "The Balkans, a Historical Laboratory," has pictured. A strong and valorous people, dominated mostly by its clans, practically without industry, a peasant nation, continuously engaged for centuries in fights for national existence and in internal strife for the supremacy of the great chieftains. Expansive, as all the Slav peoples, Servia has sought for many years to enlarge her territory. There were two possibilities: either at the expense of Turkey or at the expense of Austria-Hungary, in whose confines several millions of Serbs are living. "All Slavs are brethren"—that is the doctrine. All Slavs must be under Slavish rulers, and all territory inhabited by Serbs is part of an unalienable inheritance of the Servian kingdom. So, a "Greater Servia" has been the aim of a people who had not many cultural goods to defend, no great wealth to effeminate them, frugal and warlike as they were. In order not to go back too deep into history, I would refer my readers to the Balkan Alliance, consisting of two treaties, the one between Servia and Bulgaria of February 29, 1912, and the second between Greece and Bulgaria of May 16, 1912. These treaties contain secret clauses that were published in 1913 in *Le Matin* of Paris. These secret clauses provide for a division of the Balkans between Servia and Bulgaria on a north-southerly line, leaving the western part to Servia, the eastern part to Bulgaria. The open part of the treaty provides for a purely defensive alliance; the secret part shows the aims and the element that has been dominant in the bringing about of that alliance, directed, as to Servia, against Austria, and as to Bulgaria, against Turkey. This dominant factor is Russia. Article First of the secret clauses says:

That if Servia and Bulgaria convene to act, it is to be communicated to Russia, and if Russia does not oppose itself, the action will proceed. If they cannot agree as to an action, they will apply to Russia, whose decision will be obligatory upon both parties. Should Russia not give any opinion at all and the two parties cannot concert, that party that will undertake an action must proceed alone, the other keeping in friendly neutrality supported by partial mobilization.

Article Three says:

A copy of this treaty and of its secret clauses will be jointly communicated to the Russian Government, which will be asked to take note of it, and to give proof of its good-will regarding the ends sought, and the Emperor of Russia will be asked to kindly accept and approve for his person and his Government the rôle assigned to them in the treaty. All differences that should result from the interpretation or execution of the treaty are to be submitted to the definite decision of Russia.

And Article Five says:

This appendix is not to be published without the consent of Russia.

Thus it will be seen Russia was able to pull the strings, and she did. When Italy seized upon Tripoli, and the Turkish fleet was engaged with the Italian navy that took possession of a number of islands in the Ægean, the war was started against Turkey, and it looked for a moment as if she were to be driven out of Europe altogether. But Bulgaria aspired for more of the conquered territory than Russia was willing to concede, for reasons we shall see hereafter, and a new war broke out between Servia and Greece on the one side, and Bulgaria on the other. Bulgaria was brought very near to destruction; then the Czar of Bulgaria addressed himself for help to Austria. It was at this juncture that Russia saw fit to publish the secret clause of the treaty showing that Bulgaria had conspired with her and with Servia to fight Austria. Peace was finally concluded in Bucharest—a peace that was not to the satisfaction of Austria. She tried to engage Germany in her attempt to annul the Bucharest protocol—which Germany refused to do, although thereby greatly grieving her ally, in the interests of the peaceful people of the world. So Servia attained her end in about doubling her size; but the spirit of conquest cannot be repressed once it has started and has been successful. The Servian aim had been to gain free access to a harbor on the Adriatic. Austria had opposed herself, the Greater Servian dream remained still unfulfilled, and Servia now directed her attention to the Austrian provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, because the Austrian interests in the western part of the Balkans barred Servia's way to the sea. Then those conspiracies set in, sowing discord among Austrian peoples, inveigling into mutiny Austrian subjects, swamping Bosnia and the south of Hungary with Servian literature; it ended in the murder of the Crown Prince of Austria and his wife on June 28, and nobody who knew anything at all of the doings in the Balkans could have the slightest doubt that Servia only tackled her big neighbor because of the promise of Russia to stand by her, as was evidenced by the treaty above cited. The aims of Servia are commensurate with the nature of her people, with the state of her culture, with the ambitions of her statesmen.

But why did Russia countenance all that? Among all the Slav peoples Russia has been the most restive for ages. She has added to her dominions constantly and is now the empire of the greatest territorial extension. She is autocratic, and she must keep the minds of her people busy. It is from her soil that all the hordes have ever penetrated into Europe, from the times

of Ghengis-Khan and Timur-i-leng—Mongols, Tartars, and Poles. She has spread out east and south, her efforts always alternating in the two directions—an enormous empire that is turning now its efforts toward the building up of an industry. Having been defeated in the East in 1904, unable to retrieve her defeat by Japan in consequence of the British alliance with Japan, and being handicapped in the efforts to reach the Indian Ocean by the British-Russian compact of 1907, she again turned her eyes to the south. World-commerce and world-power are no longer confined to continents. Any considerable export trade demands access to the sea, a mercantile marine, and a certain liberty of movement. Look how she is situated in that respect! This enormous empire, the largest on earth, has not even one outlet to the sea accessible at all times of the year. Her northern harbor, Archangel, is icebound as early as September. It is connected with its industrial center only by one single-track line of more than a thousand miles. The harbor of Kronstadt is equally icebound in the winter, and it is, moreover, only a harbor to the Baltic, that is dominated by Germany. A third harbor, Vladivostok, on the far Japan Sea, is of no account, freezing up also very early in the year. Her attempt to get into the Chinese Sea by way of Port Arthur has been finally frustrated, by Japan forcing Russia to retire from it in 1904, when equally she lost her chance of reaching out by way of Korea. But all the strong Northern peoples have always had their eyes on more clement climates, and there has been from time immemorial a constant pressing of Gauls and Teutons, of Slavs and Mohammedan Indians, toward the ocean to the south. But here again Russia finds herself absolutely barred. All attempts to get free access to the Mediterranean have invariably come to naught. The Powers interested in the Mediterranean did not want another strong Power to compete with them there, or to menace their domination. So Russia in her attempts to break the Turkish rule in the Dardanelles has always been opposed by the rest of Europe. The Crimean War was waged in 1854 against Russia by the combined forces of Turkey, France, and England, and ended in the Paris protocol, re-establishing the control of Turkey over the Bosphorus, and forbidding any men-of-war to pass by Constantinople. When, by the help of Rumania, Russia was victorious in 1878 and forced upon Turkey the treaty of San Stefano, dictating its terms under the very doors of Constantinople, Europe interceded, and Russia was thrown back by the Congress of Berlin, and her efforts were again frustrated. But in 1908 she addressed herself to Austria for a revision of the Paris Treaty of 1856. Austria, while amenable to Russian demands, made her assent contingent upon French and English consent, and these two Powers did not see their way to satisfy her.

So the national tendency of Russia to get to Constantinople, and the Servian ambitions to get an outlet to the Adriatic strengthened the natural political tie between the countries. Now it is easily understood why Bulgaria was not permitted to press forward to Constantinople, or to gain a

great addition to her power. Once on the Bosphorus a "Greater Bulgaria" would prove an unsafe factor to the Russian aims; therefore, Bulgaria was first called back and then defeated with Russian assistance.

What was Austria's interest in this game? Her trade is mostly Oriental. Wherever the Russians go, the open door is closed. The looming up of a big Power on the southerly frontier meant the tearing from her of the Slav parts—a very great danger that in fact necessitated, as every one knows, a huge addition to the Austrian and German armaments in 1913. She could not split up her Slav parts without falling all to pieces. There are Rumanians in the east of Hungary; there are Serbs on the Hungarian frontier on the Danube; there are a great many of the same population in Bosnia-Herzegovina; and then, also, the great Bohemian crown land for the most part is Slav. She had a large interest in maintaining her treaty rights with Turkey. She knew of the relentless hatred of the Serbs, who could not enlarge their frontiers to the West, and the known Russian enmity that barred her way to the Ægean Sea. Austria's situation became unbearable, and the assassination of Serajevo was just a spark that fell into the powder-cask.

But could Germany forsake Austria in her struggle for life that she had to take up? In the first place, Germany had been the ally of Austria ever since 1879, for the avowed purpose of preventing Russian aggression. Then Austria is not only peopled with Slav and Hungarians—she is also a German nation—more than twelve million of her people (about 25 per cent.) being German by race, by language, and by civilization. The partition of Austria would have left that great part of the real kernel and backbone of the Dual Monarchy in a hopelessly impotent and reduced position, surrounded on two sides by people of a different race, inferior cultural attainments, and an easy prey to either of the contending factors. If the bonds of nationality, of language and culture, count for anything, Germany could not do that. And then, for her, there is another consideration of equal importance: Germany is a nation of fast-increasing population. She is industrial for the most part. She can keep her people busy at home only by having the markets of the world open to German goods. The closing of the Bosphorus by Russia would have excluded her enterprise forever from Western Asia, where she has been doing so much cultural work, and would have left the enormous Asiatic Continent to be further divided by England and Russia. All her just endeavors to peaceful commercial expansion would have been thwarted. On the other hand, the breaking up of Austria would have meant a complete isolation of Germany, with the enormous danger of an array of the Powers against her as seen in this war. So when Austria had to fight, as she had, Germany had to join with her.

We now come to the situation of France. It is said that she is fighting for revenge, and revenge is generally interpreted as retribution for the taking of Alsace-Lorraine. But that is only the outward sign of the decay of French power. For hundreds of years France had been the foremost

Power of the European Continent. She was dictating its politics, she dominated the cabinets of Europe, from the times of Richelieu and Louis XIV.; from the time of Mazarin to the French Revolution; from Napoleon I. to Talleyrand's splendid work at the Vienna Congress and as Ambassador at the Court of St. James's, down to finally Napoleon III., the French Court was always the focus of splendor, might, and imperiousness. France has been, as she styles herself always, *la grande nation*, and it was a rude awakening and a terrible disappointment when the power of United Germany definitely removed her from that position. Given to good living and comfort, and to the two-children system, she continuously lost ground as against parsimonious, frugal, and inventive Germany. The well-known tendency of Germany for family life and the raising of children under the home roof made the difference in population every year greater. Thirty-eight millions in 1780 in France and a like number in Germany changed into thirty-nine millions in the former and into nearly seventy millions in the latter country. So she felt that she could not hold her own single-handedly, and she had to seek alliances which were not to be had for the asking. She found an ally in the Russian antagonism toward Germany that had sprung up ever since Bismarck had made himself the "honest broker" of Europe at the Berlin Congress, when the prize of her war against Turkey was definitely wrested from her. France had to engage to finance Russian railways, Russian state needs, and Russian armament. She had to loan to Russia more than ten billion francs of her savings in order to maintain that friendship. So there were two motives that caused France to draw nearer and nearer to Russia and to become the bonded ally to a Power so foreign to French culture and French ideals. The first motive was to regain her lost position in Europe. The second was the fear of losing her savings invested in Russia. Had she stood out, Russia would not have hesitated to cancel all her indebtedness to France by a single stroke of her autocratic pen. It was this sort of entanglement that brought France into this European war.

Let us come to England.

It has been maintained that her jealousy against German trade, German sea power, German industry, and German expansion had been guiding factors. They had certainly a very great deal to do with the public feeling in England, and it is public sentiment to which Great Britain, more than any other nation, thinks she must listen. Sir Edward Grey, in a dispatch, on August 1 (reprinted under No. 123 of the English "White Book"), to Sir Edward Goshen, makes clear this point. He says that the German attitude with regard to Belgium affected feeling in England. If Germany could give the same assurance as France had given, it would materially contribute to relieve anxiety and tension in England. If Belgian neutrality was violated, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in that country. "He [Count Lichnowsky] asked me whether if Germany would promise not to violate Belgian neutrality we would engage to remain

neutral. I replied that I could not say that. . . . Our attitude would be determined largely by public opinion." He did not think that they could give a promise of neutrality on that condition *alone*. The German Ambassador pressed him as to whether he could not formulate conditions on which England would remain neutral. He even suggested that the integrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed, but Sir Edward Grey said that he felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain neutral on similar terms, and that England must keep her hands free.

It is clear that public opinion in England, while being strongly influenced by the Belgian case, had other grudges against Germany. That is why Sir Edward Grey would not even formulate conditions to remain neutral if Belgian neutrality was being guaranteed. I wonder why this significant despatch is always disregarded by the Americans formulating a case against Germany. While it is true that this British-German rivalry certainly played a very considerable part in the policy of the British Cabinet, I do not think that it was decisive. The English policy for ages past, adapted to the isolation of the British Isles, has been the maintenance of European equilibrium, by which is meant that England saw to it that Europe was arrayed into two hostile camps, as equally matched as possible, while she kept her hands free in order to throw her weight into the balance of that party that served her aims best. Therefore, when France had to go to war as soon as Russia became involved, she was in great fear that this equilibrium might be seriously disturbed. I believe Sir Edward Grey wanted peace under existing conditions; the equilibrium was there, and England had nothing to complain of. But if war was to be declared, France being much the weaker, it was to be expected that she would be thoroughly crushed by the German war machine and the equilibrium would have gone for good. Even if France was not despoiled of any of her provinces or possessions, yet she would have been materially so much weakened that she could not play any further part in the European concert. So England's interest was bound up with France remaining a comparatively strong Power. And so, with eyes always on that point, England became entangled beyond what she ever expected. As early as November 22, 1912, Sir Edward Grey, without the knowledge of the Cabinet, exchanged letters with the French Ambassador, acknowledging an arrangement whereby the entire French fleet was sent to the Mediterranean to protect the joint interests there while the English fleet was concentrated in the North Sea. This arrangement could not be changed when the war broke out. Sir Edward Grey said that much in a speech on August 3 in the House of Commons. He was bound to protect the French coasts and had to see to it that the French were not being reduced. It will now be understood why the English always talk of the necessity of reducing Germany to a second-rate Power by crushing out her military force. That is the only way by which France can be strengthened and England can return to her former policy. She was afraid of German expansion, as of the German inroads into English trade. But

that was not paramount. Paramount was the English interest of re-establishing a state of things such as had been the case before 1870. She knows that her next big struggle will be with Russia over her Asiatic possessions, and must keep her hands free for that, and be reassured of the state of Europe. Therefore, no matter what happened before war broke out, as soon as it was certain to come she had to be a party to it.

I stated the case of Germany as I proceeded. I have now to speak of three Powers that play a smaller rôle in the conflict: First, there is Japan. Next to Russia, Japan has been the most expansive Power, and since 1894 has acquired possession and control of three times what she had before that date. She is now out for the coast of China, pretending to fight the Germans in Kiaochow, while at the same time taking possession of all the railways from Peking south to the valley of the Yangtse. She means to dominate that part of China, just as she dominates the southern part of Manchuria, by controlling all the lines of communication, fortifying her position along those railways by putting in garrisons under the name of "railway guards," and definitely ousting European competition that cannot be maintained against the craft and frugality of the yellow man. That is a side issue whose bearing upon America I do not feel called upon to detail.

Then there is Portugal. Here there is a remarkable double play. While England is apparently assisting the Republic of Portugal and egging her on to go to war, by telling her that German expansion means a loss of Portuguese colonies, she is harboring at the same time in her confines the ex-King of Portugal; is the center of the royalist revolutionary movements against Portugal, and she feels assured that whichever way this struggle turns she will have all the advantage.

Then I come to the case of Belgium, that made so much stir in the United States. She, also, is not to be exonerated from blame. Belgium feels much safer as a buffer state in the interests of England, who, she believed, would maintain her independence and integrity, as England cannot permit any first-class Power to control the entrance to the North Sea. Belgium belongs geographically to Germany. So by playing upon Belgian fear that she, whose main harbor, Antwerp, is a natural outlet to the growing German industries, would become a German vassal, and by promising Belgium British help, assisting her in her fortifications, she made Belgium resist the two overtures of the German Chancellor, who promised integrity and indemnity in case Germany marched through Belgium. I will not dwell here on the treaty relations which Mr. Gladstone himself called a most complicated affair, and which he thought must not be maintained if they were against English interests at the time when the occasion of acting under the guarantee arose. It was Great Britain's interest that this neutrality should be kept, but it was certainly not England's reason for the war, as is made clear by the dispatch of Sir Edward Grey cited above.

The German Government has been taxed with considering treaties as

"scraps of paper." That is certainly not the German record, nor the German position toward treaties. But this treaty was a scrap of paper; the English on their side did not put any faith in it, nor were they prepared to maintain it under all circumstances. They did not consider it enforceable in 1870, and replaced it by new arrangements between the North German Confederation and France. The Chancellor regretted very much that he had to go through Belgium, although Belgium had broken that treaty herself in spirit and in letter. The American doctrine is that treaty obligations must not and cannot be kept if it is against public policy (*vide* unanimous judgment rendered in the Chinese Exclusion Treaty cases by the United States Supreme Court, printed in Vol. 130 of *U. S. Reports*, page 600). And I must say that it is one thing to ask a private individual to keep an obligation, even when suffering great loss and inconvenience, and another if a statesman responsible for sixty-six million people who are in danger of losing their liberty, national existence, and civil rights takes upon himself to encounter criticism by the world at large. Belgian neutrality was an instrument played very skilfully by Sir Edward Grey as a moral proposition. In fact, it was a proposition of public interest also for England, and neutrality had to be protected if England wanted to retain a dominant position on both sides of the Channel.

Then there is another aspect of the matter that Americans generally overlook. They always talk of Germany and Russia and the other countries as doing such and such things. They talk of statesmen having acted so or otherwise. They forget that behind these statesmen, behind these countries, there are hundreds of millions of people who have a life and a volition of their own. They forget that most of these States are guided and conducted by sets of people who do not appear very much in the foreground. The Servian people by itself has probably not been very willing to go to war again after the experience of 1912. There was a Crown Prince who was the real ruler behind the throne, and the military and clan party who, as it is now proven beyond any possibility of refutation, engineered a plot against the Crown Prince of Austria, spread a large propaganda, and drove the people to war by telling them that Austria wanted to exterminate the Servian people, notwithstanding the explicit guarantee of Austria that she would not take any Servian territory. The same is the case in Russia. The Russian people are very illiterate and uncultivated. Seventy out of one hundred Russians do not know how to read and write. They do not read papers. They follow the dictates of their clergy, the call of their "white" Czar, and implicitly believe what they are told. There is a military clique in Russia that has been constantly pressing upon the peaceful Czar that now was the time to get all the things they had wanted for so long. The Czar refused, and closed himself up for four days. The Minister of War was not in the councils of the war party, so it happened that the Russian mobilization went forward without the Czar's signature and after the Minister of War had given his word of honor that no mobilization had

been ordered. This Grand-Ducal party finally got the upper hand, as reported by the Belgian Minister in St. Petersburg on July 30 to his home Government, after having received the assurance that England would second France in case of a conflict. And this was before the Belgian incident ever arose.

Similar conditions obtained in Austria. The Archduke Francis Ferdinand had always cherished the plan of reconciling the Slav portion of the Empire by making out of the dual Monarchy a tripartite arrangement. Hungary, that would thereby lose most, was much against it. So when the Archduke was out of the way and the Hungarian Premier pressed for a more determined policy, the old Emperor was not able to make the same strong resistance.

And the same holds good also in respect to England. Sir Edward Grey never communicated the exchange of letters with the French Ambassador in 1912 to his colleagues. But when this matter could no longer be kept back, the Cabinet was amazed. Three of its members stepped out at once, declaring that they would not have anything more to do with the Government. They were Mr. John Burns, Lord Morley, and Mr. Trevelyan, who in a letter to his constituents in Ellford declared that they had always been told that the hands of England were entirely free, that they were not obligated to France in any way, but that he had found out, to his disgust, that England was so hopelessly entangled that she had to go to war. The leader of the Socialist party, Ramsay MacDonald, most severely criticized the Administration upon the same grounds, and the Liberal member of Parliament, Mr. Arthur Ponsonby, wrote a letter most severely arraigning Sir Edward Grey on his double dealing. But there were some hotheads, like Winston Churchill and Lloyd-George, and then there was the enormous danger of the Irish civil struggle that loomed up on the horizon and whose consequences could absolutely not be foreseen in a time of European conflagration. The Irish leaders were induced, by the passing of a Home Rule Bill of a very deceptive kind, to come to the aid of the Government, upon the ground of patriotism and national danger.

The only nation that is absolutely united to its Government is Germany. She knows, and it will be apparent to any thoughtful reader of the above recital, that all the nations around her want something of her—have an interest in the struggle, and are willing to fight under all circumstances. Russia wants Constantinople and the weakening of the Austrian Monarchy; England demands the reduction of Germany to a subordinate Power; France, the re-establishment of her former dominating rule of Europe. Surely, no one would consider Germany so insane and absolutely bereft of common sense that she should have desired and permitted all the nations in whose way she had been to fall on her, thereby catering for her own destruction? Will it be believed that a nation that has been constantly striving for peace, the only one of all European nations that has not had war for forty-four years, has never expanded except peacefully, never acquired territory ex-

cept by treaty, knowing that a combination of much stronger Powers threatened her from all sides, would go wilfully and light-heartedly to fight nearly the whole world? And what had she to gain if she were victorious?

So I put my case, not on doubtful evidence, or on the teachings of people who want to make believe to the American public that diplomacy is the school of truthfulness and that diplomatic papers are a clean source of information, but I put my case, and I rest it, on the history of Europe, on the forces that have been at work, not since the 28th of July, but for many years past, whose self-interest I have made evident and whose powers, aims, and ambitions are explained—an explanation which the average American scholar will be able to verify every day. Germany is united because she knows that she is fighting for her very life and existence, and against Powers who wish to reduce her to her former state of impotency and weakness and to undo the great work of Bismarck, to crush, under Slav dictation, forces that have been a boon to the civilization and advancement of the world.

THE TIES THAT BIND AMERICA AND GERMANY

The Great Infusion of German Blood in the American People, the Common Commercial Interests of the Two Nations, and Their Intellectual Fraternity

To all thinking people the great European War is not only of interest as a matter of contemporaneous history, as a touchstone of ethics and civilization, but it leads them of necessity to the consideration as to what the bearing of the struggle or its possible outcome may mean to the people of the United States. The whole net-work of international relations has been exposed by the various warring factions trying to explain to themselves and to the rest of the world the reasons that have brought this conflagration about. The undercurrents of international diplomatic action have been laid bare, and matters are brought to the public attention in America that seemed until now very foreign to the actual struggle. Happily, however, the American people can congratulate themselves that they are not directly concerned in the war, and it is as intelligible as it is wise that they should try to avoid to be drawn into the difficulty at all. Yet as in a physical person the ailing of one limb affects the well-being of the whole body, so any disturbance of a considerable part of the European Continent must needs affect the rest of the world. Modern development has made it clear that all real efficiency rests on a division of energies and functions adapted to a particular purpose and to the genius of the parts working together to reach a certain specified end. As in the work-shop of any individual, this holds good in that enormous workshop of the world. It applies not only to the production and exchange of commodities; it also applies to the ethical and spiritual field. The relations of the various peoples, the scientific as well as the commercial intercourse between them, is now being very seriously disturbed, and since every responsible mind feels called upon to investigate this disturbance, it cannot fail that a certain revision even of the feelings and tendencies must occur. So there has been everywhere in the United States, while the people were honestly trying to come to a fair judgment and preserve full neutrality, such a revision of sentiment: one party favoring more the success of the Allies, the other wishing the German cause to prevail. To deepen the sentiment, and to justify it, people dug into history, because history alone gives a clue to the logical development of present-day situations. So I propose in this article to trace the history of German-American relations, showing the bonds that so firmly hold together sympathies as well as interest between the two countries.

Next to Germany itself, no country on earth—even not excepting Austria—has so much German blood infused into it as the United States. While in Austria there are just about twelve million people speaking German,

there had no fewer than five and a half million Germans immigrated into the United States between 1829 and 1912. And as these people have multiplied considerably in their new and propitious surroundings, the estimate that no less than a quarter of the white population of the United States are either of German parentage or have German blood in their veins does not seem at all exaggerated. Certainly, the German immigration in the nineteenth century reaches a total considerably larger than that of any foreign element. As against about five million immigrants from Germany, there are three million nine hundred thousand from Ireland, three million from England, Scotland, and Wales, and one and a half million from Norway, Denmark, and Sweden.

America a Refuge for Political Exiles

Why has the United States proved so attractive especially to Germans? The history of the colonization of all the world shows two reasons that cause people to emigrate from their home country. It is not an easy thing, especially for the more sentimental German, to give up his home, leave behind relatives and friends, part from the graves of parents and ancestors, and seek a new home in a far-away and unknown country. It is still more difficult for a German, for while the English and Irish have at least the advantage of an identity of language, the German from the lower walks of life has no great facility to learn an idiom quite new to him. But the two reasons that bring about emigration have been stronger in Germany than in other countries. The first is, political and social pressure, lack of opportunity to develop the faculties of the mind and to take a part in the development of the nation. The other is the difficulties arising in making the necessary living, finding the necessary room for expanding and keeping together the family. In a word, commercial, industrial, and agricultural stagnation. Both these reasons have been very potent factors in bringing over such an enormous number of my countrymen. The nation had got a big impulse a hundred years ago when the crushed Germany rose as one man to drive out and destroy the French usurper; the greatest hopes were entertained for a new Germany as a result of that supreme effort. Thus when the diplomatists got together in 1815 in Vienna and rearranged the map of Europe, all the old dynasties returned to their antiquated and autocratic tendencies, the dangers of the French Revolution still fresh in their minds. The Holy Alliance between Russia, Austria, and Prussia was formed; German national feeling counted for nothing, and the German country was reduced to and kept in an impotent state in the form of a loose agglomeration directed by an assembly appointed by the rulers of some thirty German States without any popular consultation. But the men who shed their blood for the liberation of the Fatherland, who had for years worked and prepared for it, and had not done it alone in order to fight an external foe, but also in order to increase civic rights and national advancement, did not mean to be put down. So the next two decades saw a period of internal fight between the more liberal upper strata and the organized police power:

reformers were being prosecuted under the name of "demagogues," tried and cruelly imprisoned, and, despondent of ever attaining their ends, they sought a new home in that country that was peacefully, but effectively, developing the policy of the freedom of men. This was the first wave of intellectual Germany that was carried over on to these shores. And the same happened in 1848, when a new effort to put my country on a more liberal basis, after a short and partial success, was again mulcted by those identical Powers of the past, a furious war being waged on all the participants in the Revolution of 1848, a great number being shot, and others being imprisoned. So, again, this political pressure brought another intellectual set, thirsty for civic liberty and wishing and willing to take an active share in the framing of their own destinies, to America. So it happened that these Germans did not only come in quest of a more liberal form of government, but they were already imbued with democratic ideals, and this element did not only profit by the existence of liberal institutions in the United States, but it did also greatly help and further the development of these same institutions to a very large degree.

While political pressure mostly affects the more cultured upper classes, economic pressure invariably brings the lower classes into motion, because everybody tries to hold on as long as he possibly can to his old surroundings, and the people must, so to say, "be pressed out of the country." The point of least resistance will always be found with the people of small means, large families, and lesser gifts.

Emigration Under Economic Pressure

All Europe suffered in the end of the 'forties under a succession of crop failures. Americans know how these failures especially affected Ireland, almost a one-crop country. The potato crops failed entirely, and as the dominating nation, the English, either did not care, or could not alleviate the distress, Ireland lost about half its population, sending it to foreign shores. Very much the same happened in Germany. Population increased, crops were poor, industrial development was of the lowest order, so people became very easily unrooted. But on the other side of the water, in America, the discovery of the gold-bearing sands of California loomed up as a glowing spectre on the western horizon, and during the next two decades a continual stream of German immigration was poured into the United States. This stream continued even after the excitement over the discovery of gold abated. While the economic pressure continued in Europe, reports came from the settlers of earlier times of the splendid opportunities that the liberal land policy of the United States gave, and the extent of this movement may be gauged from the fact that in the Civil War no fewer than one hundred and seventy-seven thousand born Germans fought on the side of the North—a very much larger percentage than that contributed by all other foreign elements. It is commonly supposed that the Irish element gave the largest proportion to the Union Army, but that is not so. As

against one hundred and seventy-seven thousand German Europeans, there have been counted one hundred and forty-four thousand Irish. And Mr. Faust, in his admirable work on "The German Element in the United States," states that no fewer than five hundred thousand people of German extraction fought for the preservation of the Union.

The Panic of 1873

Soon after the Civil War, Bismarck brought about the German unification, which put at once a different aspect on the German problem. The war of 1870 gave an enormous impetus, both politically and economically, to the German people. Up to that time we felt Prussian, and Bavarian, and Saxon in our immediate relations to our Government. In America we were called fondly "Dutchmen." A nation of Germany exists only since 1870. But the tendency to develop, to build up economically the new empire, did not take into account that the wealth necessary for the carrying on of the enormous enterprises started was insufficient for the purpose. The payment of the billion dollars by France and the repayment out of that fund of all the war claims, the pouring of so much gold into the commercial arteries without an effective distributing organization, led to the "Krach" of 1873. There were no banks of sufficient strength, there was no reserve power, to help enterprises that got stuck. Curiously enough, at that time Germany was so little developed economically that the standard share in which everybody gambled was not a German, but an Austrian, security—the shares of an Austrian Credit Institute. As a consequence, a great many of the newly commenced industries had to be dropped. So Germany experienced an enormous reverse, and the stream of emigration had to go on. It took about five years to overcome this, and in 1879 a change in the policy of Germany took place; Bismarck going from the free-trade tack over to the one of a moderate protection. The influence of the teachings of America in that direction are unmistakable. The American theory of protecting infant industries by a comparatively high tariff appealed to Germany, then in a similar state. Germany became rapidly industrialized. It meant that the people could be kept at home, employed in industry, paid good wages. Although in the early 'eighties we have yet some such figures of emigration from Germany as 280,000, it very soon ceased to be of any account. Since 1894 it has practically ceased. In 1912 only 18,000 people emigrated, while, as a matter of comparison, British emigration ran as high in the same year as 469,000.

German Emigration Now Stopped

Germany is now keeping all her people busy at home. Although the population has risen from thirty-nine millions in 1870 to nearly seventy millions in 1914, she is even now short of hands and employing constantly between one and one-half million and one and three-quarter million of foreigners in her mines and her agriculture. Even in her colonies there are not more than twenty-three thousand Germans living at this time. This

change in the industrial situation necessitated the establishment of a number of distributing agencies. The growth of national feeling brought now to the fore high-class Germans who established themselves in foreign countries, but in contradistinction to the former practice these men retained their nationality and stayed distinctly German. To distribute the enormous production, the establishing of a merchant marine was necessary. Within forty years, German trade has increased 500 per cent, while the English trade has only increased 150 per cent. The watchword became "Efficiency." Efficiency means, to do everything by the most approved methods and at the least cost, which could only be done by Germans becoming independent in shipping, insurance, and finance: all of which is now being done by German national houses, who have helped enormously to increase the wealth of the United States. But these methods were not of Germany's invention. They could be found in the United States and were adapted to German needs, and a certain kind of "Americanization" of German business took place. On the other hand, the German leaning to thoroughness, a fortunate working together of theoretical and applied science, a thorough primary and technical education, helped the German mind to develop a number of specialties such as she must export in order to maintain her balance of trade. Germany is not a rich country: we are nearly independent from the rest of the world for our food supply, but as to raw material (except coal, which we have in unmeasured extent) we are dependent upon international commerce. Copper, cotton, and oil we do not produce, and we have been among the best customers of the United States in cotton, and the best in the other two articles. If we had to pay for them in cash, we would very soon have come to the end of our gold resources.

Our Friendly Trade Relations

Since America is, even up to this date, not a creditor, but a debtor nation, she can not lend any considerable amount for any length of time to other countries. So we have to pay in produce, chief of all, in our chemical products, and especially potash, of which we have a sort of monopoly. Then, the tendency of keeping our people at home and having them work in their own houses, and a certain tender feeling for the produce of our own hands, have developed an enormous toy industry that stands, strange to say, second on the list of the exports to the United States. There are, furthermore, scientific apparatus, lithographic papers, and a host of small articles that are being constantly shipped, and while none of the single items making up the German import of the United States is more than nine million dollars a year, the whole of it amounts to about one hundred and sixty millions. We import about double that amount from the United States. One hundred and ten million dollars' worth of cotton, seventy-five million dollars' worth of copper, forty millions' worth of wheat, twenty millions' of mineral oils. So we are indebted to the amount of one hundred and fifty million dollars every year to the United States. How do we pay for that? There comes another

interesting phase of German-American relations. I have spoken of the social pressure exercised in the first part of the last century, but this social pressure did not only affect Germans by race, but it was most strongly felt by the very enterprising Jewish element, who lacked equality of rights, and even after that had been given them in letter it was very often not kept in spirit. So this connection of social pressure, with the enormous advantages of the new country, caused a Jewish emigration, that formed a very valuable instrument for placing American securities in Germany. These people enjoyed the confidence of their compatriots at home, and when they recommended in 1862-3 the taking of the bonds of the North, a very large amount of the "seven thirty" bonds were sold in Germany. When the Pacific railroads were constructed, the bonds of the Central Pacific, of the California & Oregon, and Oregon & California found a large market in Germany. When Mr. Villard (himself a German by birth) undertook the completion of the Northern Pacific, more than fifty million dollars of its bonds (a very large amount, at that time) went to Germany. The coupons of these securities helped to make up the balance of trade, but most of it comes from profits of German houses, insurance premiums, the freights in American produce in German vessels, the remittances of Germans living in the United States to their home people, and other items of that character. There has been a constant give and take between these two countries, by which both of them fared extremely well. There has never been any clash of interest between the two peoples. There has always been an expansion of their mutual relations. There is, furthermore, a considerable number of American industries established in Germany. The Westinghouse Brake Company has a factory in Hanover. The Standard Oil Company has a great organization in our country. So has the Singer Sewing Machine Company and various typewriter and cash-register concerns. There is a constant interchange between the great German and American electric concerns which, to the absolute exclusion of England, are domineering all the world.

And with all this work on the materialistic side of life, the scientific and ethical sides have never been lost sight of. German and American sciences are constantly exchanging their newest attainments, and a great many American and German universities are having exchange professors. International conferences in both countries have always the largest contingent from Germany and America, and while we no longer send our intelligent people abroad for good, as we formerly had to do, we have surmounted all the difficulties in language, of the difference in the turn of mind, and now freely enjoy, and ungrudgingly, the great steps forward made in the United States.

There is in the world a great community of all people of intellect—a great flow of thought—and a solidarity of ethics, that goes on unhampered without respect to what happens in the outer world. And though there may be differences on some points, we always feel the cordiality of the American people in the spiritual life, and are grateful for the ties in our common industrial and commercial advancement.

GERMANY'S FOOD SUPPLY

Will the Germans Have an Ample Quantity of Bread and Meat for Armies and Civil Population During the Next Two Years?

(From "The Review of Reviews")

[It is in compliance with the request of the Editor of this Review that Dr. Dernburg presents the interesting data upon Germany's agriculture that will be found in the present article. Dr. Dernburg typifies Germany's efficient men of affairs who have built up the Empire's financial and industrial strength. He is one of the foremost of Berlin's bankers, is a member of the upper house of the Prussian Parliament, was for four years the Emperor's Minister of Colonies, and is a man of an extraordinary range of information, not only regarding the political, industrial, and military affairs of Germany, but also regarding the conflicts and rivalries of the great nations for foreign trade and colonial empire.—EDITOR REVIEW OF REVIEWS.]

This is asking a very broad question and one that can not be answered with any degree of correctness unless the scope of the inquiry be limited as to time. I shall, therefore, only try to give my answer for a space, say, of two years. But this answer also depends greatly upon the march of events, which may change the whole picture. I assume that Germany will hold on to Belgium and to the western part of Poland, but am not taking into consideration any foodstuffs that might be gotten from France, although it is just as likely as not that Germany will lay her hands on Havre.

Supplies from Holland, Denmark, Switzerland, Belgium

There is, furthermore, the question of the prisoners of war and the returning refugees, which might become a serious problem, if the prisoners of war in Germany, who number now about 300,000, should by Russian defeat be swollen to, say, a million. This is quite possible, in view of the fact that the battle at Tannenberg alone resulted in 90,000 prisoners. War is being waged on Germany by all her neighbors, except the three little States of Holland, Denmark, and Switzerland, the traffic connection with which can not be interrupted, and which will be under the necessity of doing a good deal of trade with Germany.

They were regularly providing Germany, before the war, with meat, dairy products, fruit, barley, wheat, all of which they will continue to furnish, together with Sweden, and that the more since the chief customer for some of these products, namely England, has shut herself off by strewing the North Sea with mines.

The same is the case with Belgium. Danish dairy products are of so high a quality that they could only be purchased in England by the rich class, so the ordinary traffic in vegetables, poultry, and butter has been done always between Belgium and England. This, of course, will all be

available for Germany as soon as Belgian agriculture has been built up again. This, by the way, is one of the things that will be done by Germany as soon as Belgium has been liberated entirely from her invaders.

From Italy and Other Neighbors

Then there is, of course, Italy; Rumania, Bulgaria. And it does not look—in spite of French temptation and the liberal use of money among the Italian mobs by the French Ambassador—as if Italy would swerve from virtue. She is growing enormous quantities of vegetables, fruit, wines, rice, and must export it to maintain her balance of payment. Now, while Germany is being hampered on all sides and practically cut off from the sea, a great many former consumers of Italian goods are also cut off, and there will be a surplus to be shipped to Germany, because it can not go anywhere else.

So, for instance, the eastern part of France and all of the western part of Russia, though I do not think that these countries will cut a very great figure. Then there is another factor that is very potent in an emergency of the present kind. No blockade, no closing of frontiers, no arrangements between authorities, will ever prevent the trickling through of considerable materials to the best payer. But that I leave entirely out of count. My figures are made up without regard to contraband, without regard to Rumanian wheat and maize, or anything else that Bulgaria may be able to spare, or to such wheat and maize as may come from Asia Minor, whence the way is absolutely open to Germany without regard to any breadstuffs from Italy, as I consider these items merely as offsets against such food-stuffs as Germany may be called upon to use in feeding a population that is not her own.

By Way of Antwerp

This population will certainly be the first to suffer. If the Allies turn their war on Germany into a war of starvation, they must be prepared for the fact that whichever Allies are in our hands will get the first show. Even if England should continue to prescribe to the United States what amounts of wheat, cotton, and other things she should sell, even if she sends the stuff in her own bottoms to neutral countries, she can not prevent any shipping in the Baltic nor regulate the overland traffic of home-grown produce of neutral countries; otherwise she would place herself in the position of a general distributor of food for half of the world, hampering not only the trade of the United States, but also mostly that of the small nations, which she would make believe to be so dear and near to her big heart.

Besides, there may be windfalls for Germany, which England has not counted upon. I rather suspect that Antwerp will prove such a windfall, although the Allies have taken care to destroy a lot of American property in the oil tanks, so as to prevent their falling into the hands of the Germans. But then, there will be some beautiful fishing now in the Scheldt and neighboring waters, and the Dutch sole is not to be despised. Of course, there

will be some delicacies that Germany will have to forego; for instance, there may be some difficulty in getting enough cocoa, but of coffee there are enormous amounts stored in Hamburg, and there will be no deficiency.

German Rye and Wheat

So the main point will be, how is Germany to provide herself with breadstuffs, meat, fresh vegetables, and fruit, the first two as necessities for life, the last as indispensable for the health of the people? Now, taking the average year, we can say, counting wheat and rye together (and as information for the Americans I must add that rye-bread is *the* bread for Germany), there is a deficiency of a million to a million and a quarter of tons that Germany does not raise herself, which is about 6 per cent of the total consumption. This will probably have to be replaced by some other food-stuff, and the one that is presenting itself is the potato, the average crop of which is about fifty million tons, but this year we have as much as 80,000,000 tons.

Potatoes—in Bread Form

In the last years the art of preserving the potato has been a great problem in Germany. For a long time the military authorities had offered a premium for a good method of preserving potatoes. This premium has now been withdrawn, as the question can be considered as having been solved. There are various methods of preserving them. In the first place, they are being cut up in very small slices and dried, the same way as all the California dried vegetables are offered in these markets. Then they have been converted into a most nutritious flour, which has heretofore been used to make cake and pastry, and this will now be added to the bread up to 20 per cent.

Now, it must be understood that 80,000,000 tons of potatoes means just about a ton and a quarter per head of the German population, equivalent to about four pounds a day all the year round for each German, women and children included. This potato crop has heretofore been mostly worked into alcohol, partly for consumption in industries, partly for beverages. But there is a very determined war being conducted in Germany against alcoholic beverages, and no soldier has been permitted even a drink of beer since the first day of mobilization.

Sugar Lands for Alfalfa

Then, of course, the food needs of the population will always have the precedence over any use of alcohol in the arts. Thus there will be a large surplus, which will more than make up any deficiency in wheat or rye. But that is not all the end of it. Germany has been raising an average of 2,500,000 tons of sugar, whereof about half is being exported.

Now, sugar has been harvested in Germany for this year, and can not be exported; consequently there is a two-years' supply on hand, which would

mean that the big acreage employed in the raising of sugar-beets is available for such crops as might be short. On fields which grew sugar-beets, anything else can be planted and will give big harvests. There may be some shortage of fodder for animals, because a great deal of that has ordinarily been imported. Accordingly, this sugar ground will probably be sowed to alfalfa and other good haymaking crops, and so there will be no difficulty on this account either. One can say, therefore, no shortage of bread-stuffs ought to be expected under these conditions.

Some Beef, Ample Pork

Americans are aware that the importation of meat into Germany has been partly prohibited, partly made impossible for a number of years, in order to give the incentive to German agriculture to raise home provisions. Ever since we knew that beef production was more or less monopolized, we have been working intensely to become independent. So at the last counting there were no fewer than 20,000,000 beeves, 5,000,000 sheep, 3,000,000 goats, and 26,000,000 hogs in Germany. By the way, there were also about 5,000,000 horses.

Beef takes about three years to ripen, while hogs are ready within the year in which they are born. This means that Germany is able to produce every year about 8,000,000 beef animals, 5,000,000 sheep and goats, and 26,000,000 hogs, and with the peasants and laborers the pork is preferred on account of its cheapness and nutritious quality. That it makes a very good food everybody will agree, who has ever tasted Westphalian ham or Göttinger sausages.

Food for Animals

Therefore, provided we can feed the animals, there will always be enough meat,—and I do think we can manage it. There are enormous areas in Germany, especially in the northwestern part, that can be turned into hayfields at short notice. As for vegetables, we have partly to rely on southern Germany, Belgium, and Italy. But the chief purveyor of late years has been Holland; and she being cut off from the English market, will yield the desired quantities. So the situation is at present entirely satisfactory, and the starving out of Germany will prove just as much a piece of British braggadocio as, for instance, Mr. Churchill's digging out of the German fleet on the very day of the loss of three British cruisers.

Labor for Agriculture

But what about the future? In the first place, the question will be that of farm labor. There are 66,000,000 Germans. Of these, 5,000,000 have been called to arms. This leaves 61,000,000. A great many industries have stopped, and all their hands are free. The German love for home and the little garden, the slice of field, and the custom of keeping at least one hog, make all these people familiar with agriculture.

But then, there are now 33 per cent of the German population engaged wholly in agriculture; and what about 300,000 Russian prisoners and as many French and Belgian prisoners? These may be employed in such crafts as they understand, according to The Hague protocol. They will be made to work for their keeping. Besides, moreover, the large estates in Germany have been worked for years past by machinery run by electricity, all of which has been driven by water-power.

Will War Stimulate Invention?

So we finally come down to the question whether we have decent harvests. Of course, a complete crop failure would be a serious matter for Germany in times of war, as well as in times of peace. But there is one element that must not be overlooked; there is nothing that incites so much the inventive genius as an emergency. It is known that Germany holds the best fertilizers of all the world in unmeasured quantities of potash, and it is known also that the necessary nitrates are being obtained by resolving the air into its component parts by electricity. The war will bring out any number of devices—processes that have been too expensive so far in competition—which will be taken up and made more perfect. Products will be turned to use that have never been thought of before. Like a good housewife who must get along suddenly upon a limited stipend per week, because some hardship has befallen her husband, so a nation, convinced of its good cause, and fairly successful in arts up to the present, will find its way and be able to buck up against the humanitarian English proposal of starving it out.

WHEN GERMANY WINS

(From "The Independent")

[We have heard a great deal about what England and France are fighting for. We have heard very little—except from English sources—about what Germany is fighting for. Here is a chance to read the other side.]

Dr. Dernburg stands for what we Americans most admire in modern Germany, its industries, its commerce, its technical schools, and its efficient organization. When the Kaiser put him at the head of the Colonial Office in 1907 it was a great shock to the Junkers, who thought that such high positions were the natural monopoly of those of noble lineage and resented the appointment of a business man, and, what was worse, a business man of American training, as successor to Prince Hohenlohe-Langenburg. But the Kaiser was tired of the bureaucratic and military methods of administration in the colonies and wanted to have them developed and made self-supporting instead of remaining a drain on the Imperial Treasury. Herr Dernburg made a personal inspection of the African possessions and would probably have made them in time as profitable as the British colonies, if he had been able to carry out his program of reforms. In "The Independent" of January 17, 1907, will be found an account of what his administration meant to Germany.

Herr Dernburg is the son of an editor of the Berlin "Tageblatt" and was born in Darmstadt fifty years ago. After graduating from the Berlin gymnasium he came to New York City in order to learn American ways, and was for some years in the banking house of Ladenburg, Thalmann & Co. After his return to Germany he became a director of the Bank of Darmstadt. He is now in this country on an important mission. As a man thoroughly familiar with American history and politics as well as finance he understands our point of view and can interpret to us the point of view of his own country. Those whose enterprise has brought their country into the front rank of commercial nations within a single generation are better representatives of the real Germany than militarists or semi-Slavonic theorists.—EDITOR INDEPENDENT.]

What will Germany do if she is entirely victorious? This question has been addressed to me by a number of American friends, time and again. And when I said that it seemed to me premature to make any such forecast, I was met with the reply that the Allies were not so overcautious, and had very freely said what they intended to do to Germany and Austria if they got the chance.

The most lenient of these programs runs about like this: The crushing of German militarism (Mr. Asquith); the destruction of the German fleet (Winston Churchill); the reduction of Germany to a subordinate Power, the breaking up of the Prussian hegemony (Lloyd-George). Of course, Belgium is to be restored and a large slice of German and Dutch territory to be added to it; Alsace-Lorraine is to be returned to France with a big indemnity in land on the left bank of the Rhine; the Polish provinces of Germany to go to Russia; Schleswig-Holstein to Denmark. And a similar program has been announced as regards the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. Finally, of course, Russia is to conquer Turkey and to absorb the whole Ottoman Empire. In short, what is intended is to reduce Germany to the position she had in 1806 after the victories of Napoleon I., which would

strike her out of the list of the great nations, and would make her subordinate to the good will of the victors.

That such a program can never be carried through, even partially, as long as there remain a hundred thousand Germans capable of bearing arms, needs not be emphasized.

But that (in view of these acknowledged demands of the Allies) it might be of some interest to Americans to know what Germany would do if she was in the position in which the Allies love to mirror themselves, I will concede.

I am speaking here as a thinking German, who knows the history of his country and who wishes her to profit from past experience, always keeping in mind that it is now the time to settle the European question for a hundred years to come, and to take care of the probable increase of our population, to secure its livelihood and prosperity. While France has remained practically stationary in her population, the regular annual increase of the German people is about 800,000 souls.

American readers who have followed Germany's development since she became a united empire will very easily be able to check my views by comparing them with the known ambitions of my people, and drawing the necessary inferences from German popular, industrial, and commercial development.

Territorial Expansion in Europe

While there may be some minor corrections of frontiers for military purposes, by occupying such frontier territory as has proven a weak spot in the German armor, I do not consider it wise, nor, I believe, do the leading people of my country, for Germany to take any European territory. She is now holding practically all the land inhabited by the German-speaking population of the world, with the exception of the Baltic provinces of Russia. Whether these could be added to the German Empire would hinge on the question whether they could be defended. A look at the map will show that this must be very difficult. The lack of homogeneity has been a great source of trouble to all the European nations. England has had the Irish trouble (which has been a very potent factor in her going to war). The unrest in Lorraine, and that of about thirty thousand Danes in the north of Schleswig, and the now past differences with several millions of Poles, have given my country considerable trouble. Italy is restive because of a few hundred thousand Italians incorporated into Austria. The Polish question is constantly occupying the Russian mind; so is the Jewish question, which has there more a racial than a religious character. The ardent desire of the Servians to redeem their brethren in Austria has given cause for the present war. So any rearrangement of the European map that would not follow national lines pretty definitely would be only a source of constant friction hereafter. This does not say that every single German is to be returned to Germany, nor every single Frenchman to France. The

position of Europe is, and will remain, such that the various States must look for defensive measures against their neighbors, and such strategic considerations should have a large share in any peace settlement. But as a general rule, I would not consider it wise for my country to attempt any territorial aggrandizement in Europe.

The Future of Belgium

From the foregoing it would follow that Belgium would not be made a German province. As events have shown, her natural position with respect to France and England—especially as a bulwark for the latter on the continental side of the Channel—has made Belgium a vassal of the two countries. As Sir Edward Grey says, he “expected” Belgium to fight to the last man. And fight she did, practically without help from the Allies. Belgium was so entangled with England by the various military “conversations” or arrangements, such as those evidenced by the plan of Colonel Bernardiston, that she could not accept the German Chancellor’s offer of integrity, indemnity, and full restoration, tendered twice—both before and after the fall of Liége. By accepting these offers, Belgium could have avoided all the misery that has since befallen her. It is her own doing that has placed her in her present plight.

Geographically, Belgium does certainly belong to the German Empire. She commands the mouth of the biggest German stream. Antwerp is most essentially a German port and the main outlet of the trade of western Germany. That Antwerp should not belong to Germany is as much an anomaly as if New Orleans and the Mississippi delta had been excluded from the Louisiana Purchase, or as if New York had remained English after the War of Independence.

These considerations will probably determine the German attitude. While no attempt is likely to be made to place Belgium within the German Empire alongside of the Kingdoms of Bavaria, of Würtemberg, and Saxony, because of her non-German population, the connection between Germany and Belgium must be strengthened by including her into the German customs union, as has been the case with Luxemburg ever since 1867; and, furthermore, the harbors of Belgium must be secured by some practical means against British or French invasion. That Belgian neutrality has been an impossibility, the past has shown, and so her state of neutrality will probably be lost for all time. On the other hand, such an arrangement would give Germany an opportunity to build up Belgium again industrially, agriculturally, and commercially, and Germany would probably have to engage to provide the necessary financial aid.

The North Sea and the Channel

England has now bottled up the North Sea by its command of the British Channel. It will be necessary in future to reestablish a *mare liberum* (a free sea). There are various means by which this could be accomplished.

The English theory, that the sea is her boundary, and that all the sea is her territory down to the three-mile limit of the other Powers, can not be tolerated.

The neutralization of all the Channel coasts—English, Dutch, Belgian, and French—even in times of war, must be necessarily secured, and the American and German doctrine that private property on the high seas should enjoy the same freedom from seizure as private property does on land, should be guaranteed by all the nations. The importance of such a stipulation will be readily recognized at a time like the present, when England makes commercial war upon the United States on the pretence of protecting her interests against the nations with which she is engaged in a struggle. It would become equally necessary to neutralize all cables; their cutting has hurt the United States even more than Germany.

The Colonies

It must be demanded, as a matter of course, that all of the colonial possessions, without exception, should be returned. But her growing population makes it absolutely imperative that Germany should also get some territory that could be populated by whites. At the present time she has no such colonies. In all the German possessions over the sea, in spite of efforts that have lasted for over thirty years, less than thirty thousand white people, including military, have been settled. So she must endeavor to get some such territory with a climate fit for her people. The Monroe Doctrine (which Germany has always recognized in letter as well as in spirit) forbids our seeking expansion on this side of the water, either in North or in South America. So we will have to turn to some such place like Morocco—if it is really fit for the purpose, which I am unable to say at this present time.

Germany and Turkey

Germany has been for about thirty-five years the associate of Turkey in developing Turkish territory, commerce, and industry. She has acquired the Oriental railways and built the Anatolian and Bagdad lines. She has established harbors and shipping companies, and engaged in mining and very extensive irrigation works. She must demand to be left with a free hand to go on with this commercial development as far as she can arrange with the sovereign power of the Porte and without outside interference. This would mean a recognized sphere of influence from the Persian Gulf to the Dardanelles.

The Commerce of the World

Germany stands, and has always stood, for the "open door and equal opportunity" policy, as to China and to other countries as well as to the British colonies, and it must be strictly maintained. All such underhanded proceedings as, for instance, the Japanese have resorted to, attempting to throttle foreign commerce by the possession of the railways in Man-

churia, must be done away with, and all the Powers must see to it that no more parts of the earth are closed to the exclusive advantage of any one nation. While every nation must have an undisputed right to treat foreign goods and foreign immigrants as she sees fit in her own interests, every nation must treat all other nations in a spirit of equality and without discrimination.

The Fate of the Smaller Nations

Of course, it is incumbent upon Germany to see that such as have helped her in her struggle shall not be left to the mercy of her antagonists. The right of the peoples to frame their own destinies must be fully recognized. If the Finnish nation, which is of non-Slavic descent, choose to join their Swedish brethren, we will have to stand up for them. If Poland has the necessary vitality, she should have a chance to show it. If the Boers want to be independent, they should have that right. And if Egypt wants to return to Turkey, she must be permitted to do so. All this must be done in such a way that no new dangers can arise to the dual alliance.

There is nothing in this program that would seriously change the aspect of Europe. There is no wish for world-dominion or any unduly predominant Power in western Europe incommensurate with the mass of 122,000,000 of Germans and Austrians, and there is no danger to the peace of Europe. It is simply the carrying out of the peaceful aims that Germany has had for the last forty-four years—the only nation of Europe that, even in the face of intense provocation, has never let herself be dragged into any war, or has taken by force a foot of territory against the will of the owner.

In conclusion, I will say that while I am speaking as a private person and can not voice in any way official sentiment, I feel sure that I am at one with the best German element, and that my opinions are shared by almost everybody in my country. My country did not wish this war, has done its utmost to ward it off, and is not like England, which, on her own testimony, stands convicted of an effort to destroy an unwelcome competitor and a people whose chief sins are diligence and thrift, and who have never harmed the rest of the world. The only thing Germany stands committed to is to hold and maintain its "place in the sun."

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